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Abstract
We examine how income shocks affect the suicide rate in Indonesia. We use a
difference-in-differences approach, exploiting the cash transfer’s nationwide roll-
out, and corroborate the findings using a randomized experiment embedded in the
program roll-out. Our estimates from the nationwide roll-out show that the cash
transfers reduce the yearly suicide rate by 0.36 per 100,000 people, corresponding
to an 18 percent decrease. Moreover, a different type of income shock, variabil-
ity in agricultural productivity, also affects the suicide rate. The cash transfer
program reduces the causal impact of the agricultural productivity shocks, suggest-
ing an important role for policy interventions. Finally, we provide evidence for a
psychological mechanism by showing that agricultural productivity shocks affect
depression.
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1 Introduction
Suicide is a pressing public health concern, causing 800,000 deaths per year globally
(WHO, 2014). Suicidal behavior is one of the leading causes of death for people with
severe mental illness (Hawton et al., 2013). While the effects of economic conditions
on mental health and depression are well-established (Baird et al., 2011; Haushofer and
Shapiro, 2016), little is known about the causal effect of economic well-being on suicidal
behavior. More specifically, no causal evidence exists that examines whether positive
income shocks, such as poverty alleviation programs, can decrease suicides.
It is difficult to credibly quantify the impact of improved economic well-being and, in
particular, poverty alleviation programs on suicide rates. First, it is challenging to find
suicide data at sufficiently low levels of geographic disaggregation to ensure statistical
power. Second, the timing and geographic placement of large government programs is
usually endogenous, and even if small-scale programs demonstrate causality, external
validity concerns predominate (Allcott, 2015; Deaton, 2010).
Our data and empirical setting address these difficulties. We focus on Indonesia,
the world’s fourth most populous country. We leverage unique Indonesian village-level
census data from 2000 to 2014, and use several identification strategies to examine the
causal effect of income shocks: The first is a conditional cash transfer program, Program
Keluarga Harapan (PKH), which provides households with yearly cash transfers worth
about 10% of their pre-treatment annual consumption over six years. Using a difference-
in-differences specification, we estimate the effect of the program’s nationwide roll-out.
The program targeted subdistricts with high levels of poverty rates, sufficient supply-side
health and educational institutions, and was launched in 2007 when it covered 13% of
Indonesian subdistricts in seven provinces. The program was widely expanded, reaching
57% of subdistricts across all 33 provinces in 2013. We use two stages of the roll-out
as identifying variation: the first stage of subdistricts who received the treatment from
2007 to 2011 and the second stage of subdistricts who received the treatment in 2012 and
2013. We also analyze a randomized controlled trial of the same program. Second, we
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exploit plausibly exogenous agricultural productivity shocks, using rainfall variation, and
examine whether the effects of the cash transfer vary systematically with these agricultural
productivity shocks.
We establish several novel facts regarding the relationship between economic well-
being and suicides. Our first finding is that both the cash transfer’s roll-out and the
randomized cash transfer cause a large reduction of suicides. Our main specification
suggests that an average per-capita transfer of 22.45 USD targeted at the poorest 10
percent of households causes a decrease in the suicide rate by approximately 0.36 suicides
per 100,000 population per year. This corresponds to a reduction of the suicide rate by
approximately 18 percent relative to the mean suicide rate (in 2011 and 2014) of 2 suicides
per 100,000 in control subdistricts. Second, we show that agricultural productivity shocks,
proxied by rainfall, significantly affect the incidence of suicide. A one standard deviation
increase in rainfall increases yearly per-capita consumption by 21.6 USD and decreases
the number of suicides per 100,000 inhabitants by approximately 0.08, corresponding to a
reduction of 6 percent relative to the average suicide rate in Indonesia between 2000 and
2014. For the subsamples affected by the income shocks, our calculations suggest that
per-dollar effects on suicides identified using rainfall are significantly smaller than those
from cash transfers. Third, we establish that cash transfers lower suicides most strongly
in subdistricts experiencing negative agricultural productivity shocks. This is consistent
with social welfare programs mitigating the adverse effects of negative economic shocks.
Finally, we provide evidence that income shocks may ignite suicidal behavior by af-
fecting people’s mental health. The medical literature suggests that stress (Mann et al.,
1999) and mental illness, such as depression, are major causes for suicides (Boldrini and
Mann, 2015). We use panel data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey to show that
agricultural productivity shocks causally affect farmers’ mental health. A one standard
deviation increase in subdistrict level rainfall increases consumption by approximately
seven percent, and reduces depression by 0.12 of a standard deviation. Moreover, the
relationship between rainfall and depression is absent for non-farmers, indicating that
the effects of rainfall operate through an economic channel.
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We contribute to the literature on how economic and social circumstances affect sui-
cides (Becker and Woessmann, 2018; Campaniello et al., 2017; Cutler et al., 2001; Daly
et al., 2013; Ludwig et al., 2009; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2006). Concurrent work by
Carleton (2017) shows that across Indian states, for temperatures above 20◦C, a 1◦C rise
causes roughly 70 suicides per day, particularly during the agricultural growing season.1
Our evidence supports the view that the positive effects of the cash transfer program on
recipients’ mental health (Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016) outweigh negative spillovers of
such programs (Baird et al., 2013).
Our paper also contributes to the literature on poverty, income shocks, and mental
health, the latter of which is usually measured through self-reported scales (Adhvaryu et
al., forthcoming; Baicker et al., 2013; Cesarini et al., 2015; Das et al., 2007; Devoto et al.,
2012; Friedman and Thomas, 2009; Gardner and Oswald, 2007; Kling et al., 2007; Kuhn
et al., 2011; Persson and Rossin-Slater, 2018). In particular, previous papers examine the
effects of randomized cash transfers on mental health through survey questions (Baird et
al., 2013; Paxson and Schady, 2007). An exception is Haushofer and Shapiro (2016) who
show that large, unconditional cash transfers can reduce cortisol levels, consistent with
self-reported reductions in stress.
Our study advances the literature on poverty and mental health in three ways. First,
we provide the first causal evidence on whether positive income shocks, and in particular
government poverty alleviation programs, reduce suicides. Second, unlike previous evi-
dence on income shocks and mental health which mostly relies on small-scale experiments,
we use both a large-scale nationwide roll-out of a conditional cash transfer program and
a randomized evaluation of the same program. Finally, we provide the first evidence on
the interaction between social welfare programs and agricultural productivity shocks on
mental health, underlining the potential of government programs to alleviate negative
consequences of adverse economic shocks.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we outline a conceptual framework, describe the
1 There is also correlational evidence highlighting that recessions increase suicides (Chang et al., 2013;
Reeves et al., 2012).
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data, and the cash transfer program. In Section 3, we present our identification strategies,
and describe our results using both the cash transfer and agricultural productivity shocks.
In Section 4, we examine mechanisms underlying our estimated treatment effects by
employing microdata on depression. In Section 5, we discuss effect sizes and we conclude
in Section 6.
2 Conceptual Framework, Context, and Data
In this Section we describe the conceptual framework, the main features of the conditional
cash transfer program, the suicide data and the construction of the subdistrict panel.
Finally, we report some basic descriptive statistics about Indonesian suicide rates.
2.1 Conceptual Framework
Related literature What are the theoretical links between economic well-being and
suicides? Previous psychiatric disorders are the most important factor in explaining
death by suicide; 90% of those who committed suicide had such a disorder (Cavanagh
et al., 2003). Hawton et al. (2013) claim that specific mental health problems, such
as depression, are mainly responsible for the decision to commit suicide. Poverty and
negative economic shocks are also associated with mental health disorders and depression
in particular (Haushofer and Fehr, 2014; McInerney et al., 2013; Schilbach et al., 2016).
Negative life experiences, such as loss of income and job loss, have also been identified as
risk factors for suicide.2
Stress is a likely mechanism at play, as suicide risk is correlated with abnormal cortisol
concentrations, and a maladaptive cortisol response to stress (O’Connor and Nock, 2014).
This is in line with psychological models of suicide which emphasize that pre-existing
2 In addition, there is a literature emphasizing that suicides can be contagious, i.e. that the social
environment plays an important role (Hedstro¨m et al., 2008). There are also literatures that examine
how genes (Roy, 1992), social isolation (Appleby et al., 1999), and personality traits (Blu¨ml et al.,
2013) affect people’s tendency to commit suicide.
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medical conditions coupled with stress lead to suicidal behavior (Mann et al., 1999).3
The main object of interest in this paper is to understand how economic shocks affect
the suicide rate. Positive economic shocks could affect the suicide rate directly by miti-
gating the consequences of negative life experiences or through improvements in mental
health. In Section 4, we provide suggestive evidence in support of mental health as a
channel by analyzing the relationship between economic shocks and depression.
Functional Form Our data and setting allow us to provide evidence on the func-
tional form of the relationship between the suicide rate and income. Models of reference-
dependent preferences predict declining effects of permanent income shocks over time
as individuals’ reference points adapt to the income level.4 Indeed, previous evidence
suggests that the effects of permanent improvements in economic circumstances on self-
reported mental well-being decline over time as individuals adapt to their new economic
situation (e.g. Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999; Galiani et al., forthcoming). We test the
predictions of models of reference-dependence by analyzing the dynamic treatment effects
over the program duration of six years.
If the marginal impact of income on the suicide rate decreases in income, then we
expect a convex relationship between the suicide rate and income. In this case, the
impact of a positive income shock should be larger if the recipients of the shock are
poorer to begin with. If the relationship is linear there should be no heterogeneity by
initial poverty levels. We test the implications of different functional forms by analyzing
treatment heterogeneity of the cash transfer program by the extent of initial poverty,
as proxied by agricultural productivity shocks. We also use micro-data to test whether
the effects of agricultural productivity shocks on depression depend on initial poverty as
3 Joiner (2005) puts forward an interpersonal theory of suicide, which posits that the coexistence of
high feelings of burdensomeness, low levels of belongingness, and the belief that these conditions are
hopeless to change, lead to the development of suicidal desires. Finally, social isolation and lack of
social support consistently predict suicide risk (Appleby et al., 1999).
4 Models in which the reference point fully adapts after one period predict that there is a fall in suicides
only in the first year of a permanent income shock and no effects thereafter.
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proxied by pre-treatment per-capita household consumption.
Types of Income Shocks Different types of income shocks may have different quan-
titative impacts on the suicide rate. The effect of an income shock likely depends on
its effect on expected lifetime income and the uncertainty about lifetime income, that is
its current consumption value. Therefore, predictable and regular cash transfers should
have larger per-dollar impacts on the suicide rate than unpredictable agricultural income
shocks, a prediction which we test in this paper.
2.2 The Conditional Cash Transfer Program
We use the Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH) conditional cash transfer program to ana-
lyze the impact on suicide rates (Banerjee et al., 2017; Cahyadi et al., 2018; World Bank,
2011). A pilot version of the PKH was introduced in 2007 for 600,000 households and
the program was then expanded to cover 5.2 million households in 2014 with a target
of 10 million recipients in 2018 (World Bank, 2017). The introduction of the PKH pro-
gram was part of a wider effort to reform the Indonesian social security system. In 2005
the Indonesian government removed universal fuel subsidies. To alleviate the immediate
inflationary shock for poor and near-poor households, the Indonesian government intro-
duced an unconditional cash transfer program covering 19 million households from 2005
to 2006. Furthermore, existing large-scale social assistance programs, such as rice subsi-
dies for poor households (Beras untuk Rakyat Miskin, or Raskin) and subsidized health
insurance for the poor (Asuransi Kesehatan Miskin, Askeskin), were expanded. The PKH
program was introduced in 2007 after the unconditional cash transfer ended to provide
more targeted assistance to the poorest households (World Bank, 2012).5
PKH was designed to improve poor households’ health and education through a cash
transfer, conditional on their participation in health and education services (World Bank,
5 PKH’s coverage is significantly below of that of the other social benefit programs, but due to its
targeted nature the World Bank considers it one of the most effective Indonesian social assistance
programs (World Bank, 2017).
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2011). The intervention’s size was substantial: households received between 39 and 220
US dollars per year. The average received amount constituted about 10% of pre-PKH
yearly household expenditure (80.82 US dollars at 2005 prices) between 2007 and 2014
(World Bank, 2011, 2017). Households were part of the PKH program for up to six years.
The total cost of the PKH program from 2007 to 2014 was around 716 million USD at
2005 prices. In total there were 7.6 million household-years of cash transfer such that the
average expenditure per household-year was 94 USD (World Bank, 2017). According to
the 2011 village census, the average household size in Indonesia in 2011 was 3.6 individuals
which implies an expenditure of 26.11 USD per treated individual and year. Subtracting
administrative overhead households received 22.45 USD per capita on average.
Geographic Roll-Out of Program In Section 3.1 we exploit two stages of the roll-out
of the PKH program as identifying variation for the difference-in-differences estimation:
the first stage of subdistricts who received the treatment from 2007 to 2011 and the
second stage of subdistricts who received the treatment in 2012 and 2013. The program
was first implemented as a pilot program in 2007 in seven provinces: West Java, East Java,
North Sulawesi, Gorontalo, East Nusa Tenggara (NTT), West Sumatra and DKI Jakarta.
These provinces are quite diverse in terms of their poverty levels, and other economic and
geographic characteristics. Because the program’s focus is on poverty alleviation, upper
income quintile districts were initially excluded from PKH eligibility, based on an index
considering poverty rates, malnutrition and schooling records.6 Most of the 2007 roll-out
of the program was randomized among selected eligible districts.
From 2008 to 2010 the program maintained its pilot status but was further expanded
in the following provinces: Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, North Sumatra, Banten, South
Kalimanten, West Nusa Tenggara, and the Yogyakarta Special Region. Since 2010 the
Secretariat of the National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (TNP2K), at
6 Districts receiving the rural community-driven development project were eligible for the community
cash transfer program (PNPM Generasi), and therefore were ineligible for the PKH program during
the pilot operation.
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the Office of the Vice-President, has been promoting the nationwide expansion of PKH
leading to all Indonesian provinces being covered by 2012. Of the subdistricts included in
our analysis, the PKH program covered about 13% of all Indonesian subdistricts when it
started in 2007. By 2013, 57% of all Indonesian subdistricts in our sample were in receipt
of the program.
At the macro level, targets for overall recipient numbers and total expenditure were
set at the national level which determined the overall speed of the roll-out. At the micro
level, target subdistricts were determined in cooperation with provincial and district
governments who made recommendations. The final decisions took into account three
main factors: subdistrict poverty levels, existence of the necessary supply-side institutions
(e.g. educational institutions and health centers), and the willingness of local partners to
cooperate.
Randomized Experiment In Section 3.2 we use a subsample of subdistricts in which
the treatment status was randomly assigned and which formed the basis for the World
Bank’s evaluation of the program (World Bank, 2011). A total of 736 subdistricts were in-
cluded in the sample, with 438 subdistricts randomized to the treatment group (Cahyadi
et al., 2018). Of these, we observe treatment assignment for the 360 subdistricts that
were randomly chosen for data collection by the World Bank (180 treatment, 180 con-
trol). Political pressures and a consequent unexpected program expansion in East Java
resulted in deviations of the realized allocation from the intended one.7 To deal with this
contamination, we use the original treatment assignment to measure the conditional cash
transfer program’s impact on suicide.
7 In particular, 37 out of the 360 subdistricts that were supposed to be part of the control group received
PKH funds before 2011. Moreover, for a very few subdistricts, the program started in 2008 or 2009
rather than in 2007. Bias might result from this contamination, since it is possible that unobserved
factors within the contaminated subdistricts also affected household responses. The contamination
increased further leading to 30 percent of control subdistricts receiving the program by 2014.
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Beneficiary Selection At the subdistrict level, the cash transfer program was offered
to a list of eligible households that satisfied both certain demographic as well as cer-
tain economic requirements. A 2005 census from a national unconditional cash transfer
program was initially used to construct the list of eligible households per village. Ap-
proximately 30-40 percent of beneficiaries from the unconditional cash transfer program
were not included in the list of eligible households.8 Based on this list of households, de-
mographic data was used to identify eligible households that fulfilled one of the following
program criteria: (i) households with pregnant and/or lactating women; (ii) households
with children aged 0-15 years; (iii) households with children aged 16-18 years who have
not yet completed 9 years of basic education. However, only the subset of eligible house-
holds with the lowest predicted consumption were included in the program. In the end,
approximately 10% of households received the program. The classification was based on
proxy-means tests of all households on the list of eligibles to identify program beneficia-
ries. The proxy-means tests consisted of 29 variables, including housing characteristics,
education levels, sources of fuel, employment information and access to health and edu-
cation services.
2.3 Data
We use the censuses of all Indonesian villages (PODES) from 2000, 2003, 2005, 2011, and
2014 to examine the PKH program’s effect on suicide rates. The PODES data covers all
80,000 villages in Indonesia. In the village census, village heads report village character-
istics, such as population size, the presence of health and educational institutions, and
the percentage of farmers.
Outcome Definitions The census contains data on suicides at the village level. In
2000, 2003 and 2005 the village head was asked whether any suicide occurred in their
village in the previous year. In 2011 village heads were asked about the number of suicides
8 Statistics Indonesia also conducted additional interviews in targeted subdistricts to identify newly
poor households, in an attempt to minimize exclusion errors.
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committed in the last year. Finally, in 2014 the PODES survey asked for the number of
suicides and suicide attempts in the village during the last year. Village level population
data is available from 2000 to 2011, but not for 2014. To obtain population data for 2014,
we extrapolate population size using a linear trend from the years 2005 and 2011 to 2014
at the subdistrict level.
We use the PODES census data to construct the main outcome measure of interest:
the number of suicides per 100,000 inhabitants at the subdistrict level. For the years 2000,
2003 and 2005 (all prior to the cash transfer program), we use the number of villages with
at least one suicide per 100,000 inhabitants as a proxy for the actual suicide rate. For
the PODES 2011 data we directly use the number of suicides per 100,000 inhabitants at
the subdistrict level. Lastly, we define the suicide rate in 2014 as the number of suicides
and suicide attempts per 100,000 inhabitants.
We also construct a measure of the suicide rate for which the definition does not vary
across years (except for 2014 when the question included suicide attempts). Specifically,
we extrapolate the expected suicide rate from the subdistrict mean of village level oc-
currences of at least one suicide. This requires two assumptions: first, we assume that
suicides are Poisson-distributed. Second, we assume that suicides in all villages of the
same subdistrict are independent and have the same Poisson parameter λ. Under these
assumptions we can use the mean incidence of at least one suicide (s¯) to calculate the
expected number of suicides Ev(s) in a given village as Ev(s) = − ln (1− s¯).9 To calculate
the expected number of suicides at the subdistrict level we multiply Ev(s) by the number
of villages in a subdistrict. We validate this measure with data on the actual number
of suicides in the years 2011 and 2014 and find a correlation of ρ = 0.95. Moreover, in
Section 3.4 we show that our results are robust to using different outcome measures.
9 This is derived from the cumulative distribution function of the Poisson Distribution: CDF (k) =
e−λ
∑bkc
i=0
λi
i! . We observe the fraction of villages with zero reported suicides, which gives a subdistrict
specific estimate of CDF (0). Expressed as fraction of villages with at least one suicide we get:
CDF (0) = 1 − s¯. Using the functional form of the Poisson distribution we obtain Ev(s) = λ =
− ln (1− s¯). There is one subdistrict in 2014 where all villages have at least one suicide or suicide
attempt. For this observation we use the average subdistrict λ over the preceding four census waves.
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According to the WHO Health Data repository the age-standardized suicide rate in
Indonesia stood at around 3 per 100,000 in 2015. This seems relatively well-aligned with
our data, where we find mean raw suicide rates of approximately 2 per 100,000 at the
subdistrict level in 2011 and 2014.10
Indonesia has low suicide rates from an international perspective. In a WHO world-
wide ranking of all nations by suicide rates, Indonesia ranked 173 out of 183 nations. This
low baseline suicide rate could imply stronger social norms against suicides in Indonesia.
These norms might not only affect the level of the suicide rate, but also the elasticity of
suicides with respect to economic shocks. However, it is theoretically unclear how these
norms would affect the relationship between the suicide rate and economic circumstances.
On the one hand, decisions to commit suicide might be more marginal than in other
countries, that is a small improvement in economic circumstances could prevent more
suicides. On the other hand, it is possible that because of the strong stigma non-economic
factors play a more important role for suicides in Indonesia.
Subdistrict Panel Construction Since our key identifying variation is at the sub-
district level, we aggregate our village panel at the subdistrict level and collapse our
observations at the subdistrict boundaries from 2000. We use these subdistrict bound-
aries as 2000 is the first year for which suicide data is available.11 For practical reasons
we construct our panel at the subdistrict level as the number of administrative units in
Indonesia substantially increased over time.12 In the experimental sample there are 314
10 The slight discrepancy between those numbers can be explained by the fact that the WHO estimates
are model-based and only partially take into account micro-data on suicides in Indonesia.
11 We use 2000 borders to provide a consistent interpretation of coefficients for all our subdistrict level
specifications. Furthermore, using subdistrict border definitions from after 2000 would complicate
both the presentation of pre-trends and the analysis of interactions between agricultural productivity
shocks and cash transfers (presented in Section 3.1 and 3.6). We show that our results are robust to
using the 2006 subdistrict borders (Tables A.8 and A.14).
12 Decentralization reforms beginning from 1998 significantly increased the proliferation of administrative
units. For example, the number of districts increased from 302 in 1999 to more than 500 in 2014 (Bazzi
and Gudgeon, 2018). The number of subdistricts increased from about 3000 in the late 1990s to
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subdistricts according to 2000 boundary definitions. In our analysis we only make use of
310 subdistricts for which we can construct a cross-walk between 2000 and 2014. For the
roll-out of the program and the analysis of agricultural productivity shocks (presented in
Section 3.4) we employ the universe of Indonesian subdistricts for which we could con-
struct a consistent panel between 2000 and 2014. We were able to construct such a panel
for 3138 out of all 3928 subdistricts according to 2000 boundary definitions. The panel’s
construction was based on a subdistrict-level crosswalk for the time period of 2000 to
2014. Owing to the subdistrict-splits, there are 1485 cases in which a subdistrict split
from 2000 to 2014. If only a part of the 2000 subdistrict received the cash transfer in
a given year, we define the treatment indicator as the fraction of new subdistricts re-
ceiving the PKH program. When we drop the observations with partially treated origin
subdistricts our estimated treatment effects barely change (see Tables A.6 and A.12).
Descriptives and Correlates of Suicide Rates Table 1 displays descriptive statis-
tics at the subdistrict level from the PODES 2005 data, before the cash transfer was
implemented. On average, a subdistrict consists of 17.2 villages and has a population of
approximately 56,000. Most subdistricts are relatively rural, with on average 74% of vil-
lages classified as rural and 56% of the population working as farmers. Thus, agricultural
productivity shocks are likely to affect large parts of the population. The RCT sample is
more rural than the average, but otherwise is similar to non-RCT subdistricts.
[Insert Table 1]
We exploit baseline data from the 2005 census to characterize the correlates of suicides.
We find a strong economic gradient in suicide rates. Subdistricts in districts with a 10%
larger share of the households below the poverty line have, on average, a 0.142 higher
suicide rate per 100,000 people (see Column 1 of Table A.1 in the Online Appendix).
The same pattern is apparent when we consider per capita expenditure at the district
approximately 7000 in 2014. Constructing a cross-walk at the village level is particularly challenging
and would necessarily result in a large number of incorrect matches over time. This would substantially
increase measurement error of outcomes.
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level. The share of farmers at the subdistrict level is strongly positively correlated with
suicide rates. The share of farmers at the subdistrict level remains significantly correlated
with suicide rates after controlling for local crime rates, health, education, and social
institutions.13 Table A.1 also reveals that crime per capita is weakly positively related
to suicide incidence, but that social organizations per capita and educational institutions
per capita are not correlated with suicide rates.14
Finally, we observe an increase in the occurrence of any suicide in subdistricts over
time. The incidence of at least one suicide at the subdistrict level increased from 21
percent in 2000 to 45 percent in 2005 and 52 percent in 2011 and 2014.15,16
3 Main Results
In this Section, we first present evidence from the difference-in-differences approach using
the nationwide roll-out of the cash transfer program. We then show results of a ran-
domized controlled trial of the same program. Thereafter, we examine the dynamics of
treatment effects, and assess the robustness of our findings. Finally, we study how agri-
13 Since the share of farmer variable is available at the subdistrict level, this may explain why it remains
statistically significant, while per capita expenditure and fraction poor which are measured at the
district level, become statistically insignificant.
14 We find that health institutions per capita are positively correlated with suicide rates, consistent with
the government targeting health care provision to more needy subdistricts.
15 The increase in reported suicides between 2000 and 2005 could be the result of shifting norms around
suicides, potentially affecting the willingness to report suicides by the village chiefs. However, such
a shift in norms is unlikely to affect the direction and magnitude of our treatment effects estimates.
For our preferred specification, we rely on data from 2005 to 2014 directly avoiding the influence of
potential under-reporting in 2000 and 2003. Furthermore, even when we include the 2000 and 2003
census waves, the treatment effect point estimate hardly changes suggesting a limited of role of this
under-reporting. Lastly, a shift of norms could only effect the direction of the treatment effect if it
occurred differentially in subdistricts with and without the cash transfer program and in subdistricts
with and without agricultural productivity shocks.
16 Comparing other measures of suicides over time is complicated by changing survey questions and
changes in the number of villages per subdistrict.
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cultural productivity shocks affect suicide rates, and examine how they interact with the
roll-out of the cash transfer program.
3.1 Nationwide Program Roll-Out
We provide evidence that the PKH conditional cash transfer program substantially de-
creased the suicide rate using a difference-in-differences approach exploiting the nation-
wide roll-out of the program. For our main specification we use suicide data from the
census of villages from 2005, 2011, and 2014, but we also employ data from 2000 and 2003
to assess robustness and pre-trends. Our dependent variable is the number of suicides
per 100,000 individuals (yst) in subdistrict s and at time t.
To estimate treatment effects we include subdistrict fixed effects (αs), time fixed effects
(φt), and a treatment indicator, Treatst, taking value one when a subdistrict started
receiving the program.17 This means that we effectively exploit differences in the timing
of the receipt of the cash transfer program at the subdistrict level to estimate treatment
effects. In particular, we use two stages of the roll-out as identifying variation to estimate
treatment effects: the first stage of subdistricts who received the treatment from 2007 to
2011 and the second stage of subdistricts who received the treatment in 2012 and 2013.
We use all subdistricts that had not received the cash transfer program in a given census
wave as controls. Even though the identifying variation is at the subdistrict level, we
cluster standard errors at the district level, as the roll-out of the program was correlated
at the district level. We estimate all of our main specifications with OLS and employ
population weights from 2005.18 Our specification of interest is:
yst = δ1Treatst + αs + φt + εst (1)
17 For subdistricts that split up over time, the treatment variable indicates the fraction of subdistricts
(based on the 2000 boundary definitions) that receive the treatment.
18 We use population weights since the welfare relevant metric of interest are changes in the overall
Indonesian suicide rate and not the average subdistrict suicide rate. Furthermore, the suicide rate is
measured with less error in larger subdistricts which increases the precision of our estimates.
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Our main coefficient of interest is δ1, which provides us with the treatment effect for the
subdistricts that had started receiving the program at the time of the data collection.
Column 1 of Table 2 shows that receiving the cash transfer program of on average 22.45
USD per year reduces the number of suicides per 100,000 inhabitants by 0.36. This
corresponds to a reduction by approximately 18 percent relative to the control mean in
2011 and 2014. Our estimates remain economically and statistically significant when
(i) clustering errors at the subdistrict level (Column 2), (ii) excluding the sample of
subdistricts with randomized treatment assignment employed in Section 3.2 (Column 3),
including all pre-treatment periods (Column 4) and including subdistrict specific time
trends (Column 5). Column 6 displays the treatment effects that give equal weight to
the subdistricts regardless of their population size in 2005. This reveals an estimate of
-0.591 suicides per 100,000 people, suggesting that the suicide reductions are larger in
subdistricts with smaller population sizes.19
[Insert Table 2]
A key assumption underlying the difference-in-differences approach is that treatment
and control subdistricts are on parallel trends. Figure 1 provides evidence supportive
of the common trend assumption.20 It displays pre-trends relative to the timing of the
introduction of the conditional cash transfer program by treatment wave. Differences in
the first period before the treatment are normalized to zero. The displayed coefficients
are the difference-in-differences treatment effect estimates using subdistricts that had not
received the PKH program until 2013 as counterfactuals. Moreover, as shown above,
the effects remain both economically and statistically significant after controlling for
19 Our results are also robust to using district fixed effects instead of subdistrict fixed effects, controlling
for district trends, including controls in a specification without subdistrict fixed effects, and allowing
for differential trends by baseline covariates (Table A.9).
20 We also provide further results consistent with parallel trends. Figure A.1 displays the evolution
of mean suicide rates over time. Table A.3 shows that pre-trends are uncorrelated with timing of
entry (Column 1) and that the level of the suicide rate in the period before a subdistrict received the
program does not drive the treatment effects (Column 2).
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subdistrict-specific trends. We find consistently large negative and significant effects
across a series of specifications. While we have provided evidence in support of the
parallel-trend assumption, there is no formal test of the validity of this identification
assumption.
[Insert Figure 1]
3.2 Randomized Controlled Trial
In this subsection, we use those subdistricts in which the treatment was randomly assigned
to test whether the experimental treatment effect estimates are in line with the non-
experimental roll-out analysis from the previous section.
Balance As a first step, we test whether the treatment and control group are balanced in
terms of observables. Let Ts denote the PKH program’s original allocation, where Ts = 1
if the subdistrict was randomly assigned to receive the program, and Ts = 0 otherwise.
We consider whether baseline balance holds for the original treatment assignment by
comparing means and clustering standard errors at the subdistrict level. In Table A.2,
we provide evidence of baseline balance on a set of observables. We cannot reject the null
hypothesis of global balance (p = 0.57).
Results We estimate treatment effects using the randomized assignment of the cash
transfer program, clustering standard errors at the subdistrict level and weighting obser-
vations by population size in 2005.21 Despite the randomization of cash transfers at the
subdistrict level, we find some evidence that treated subdistricts were on an upward trend
21 We do not use the 2014 census in this section. While contamination of the randomization was quite
low in 2011 (with 10 percent of subdistricts having an actual treatment status differing from the
randomly assigned one), the contamination of the program strongly increased over time. By 2014, 30
percent of control subdistricts received the program. Moreover, the cash transfer ended in 2012 and
2013 so that only a subset of subdistricts was still receiving the program during the relevant period
from PODES 2014. We discuss the long-run effects of the PKH program in Section 3.3.
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compared to control subdistricts (Figure A.4) and some gap in the suicide rate before
the program was launched (Table A.2). As a result of the common trend violation and
the slight baseline imbalance, difference-in-differences estimators might be upward biased
and a more conservative way of evaluating treatment effects is to employ an ANCOVA
and a post-estimator.
The ANCOVA specification in Column 1 of Table 3 shows that subdistricts randomly
assigned to receive the same conditional cash transfer program as in Section 3.1 have, on
average, a 0.337 lower suicide rate (about 19% of the control mean in 2011). Compar-
ing mean suicide rates between treatment and control subdistricts in 2011 also yields an
insignificant average decrease of 0.258 suicides per 100,000 (Column 2). While the mag-
nitudes of the effects are economically meaningful and of very similar size to the roll-out
estimates, they are statistically insignificant. We attribute this lack of significance to low
statistical power.22
We also estimate the effect of the RCT using difference-in-differences specifications and
find mostly significant negative treatment effects (Columns 3 to 6 of Table 3) confirming
that the cash transfer program reduced suicides. However, given the pre-trend violation
and slight baseline imbalance, the effect sizes of the ANCOVA and post-estimator are
more credible. The results of the RCT are in line with the roll-out results. The key
difference between the two pieces of evidence is that the results from the roll-out are
much more precisely estimated as they are based on a 10 times larger sample size than
the estimates from the RCT.
[Insert Table 3]
3.3 Dynamics of Treatment Effects
In this subsection, we show that the cash transfer program had persistent treatment
effects throughout the six-year duration of the program. To do so, we plot the evolution
22 Ex-post power calculations show that we had 80% power to detect a 0.770 effect size at the five percent
level with the ANCOVA specification.
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of the estimated treatment effect of the PKH program on suicide rates over time (Figure
2). To estimate the plotted coefficients we exploit the fact that the census data collection
occurred at different points in time relative to the beginning of the treatment for different
subdistricts. This means that each point estimate is obtained by comparing a different
sample of treatment and control subdistricts.23 Treated subdistricts in a given period t
are defined as having received the cash transfer program exactly t before (or after) the
census. For t ≥ 0 control subdistricts are defined as subdistricts that had not received
the treatment at the time of the census. For t < 0 control subdistricts are defined as not
having received the treatment t years after the census. This also leads to differences in
sample size and precision in the estimation of treatment effects, as apparent by variation
in the width of confidence intervals.
A clear temporal pattern emerges from Figure 2. Similar to the roll-out analysis there
are no detectable difference between treatment and control subdistricts in the years prior
to receiving the cash transfer program. However, starting in the year subdistricts first
receive the treatment cash transfer program the suicide rate declines by about -0.3 in line
with the aggregate analysis. The difference in the suicide rate persists throughout the
six-year duration of the cash transfer program without any obvious changes in the effect
size.24 The treatment effect also persists into year seven after the treatment, potentially
suggesting a persistence beyond the receipt of the program. However, the periods are
defined in calendar years so that we cannot rule out that persistence is driven by subdis-
tricts who started receiving the program in late 2007 still receiving the program at the
time of the census data collection in early 2014.
These findings also imply that the duration of exposure to the treatment does not
affect the estimated effects of the program. To more formally test this we run a regression
in which we include a treatment indicator as well as a variable on the number of years
23 We do observe some treated subdistricts at two different points in time which allows us to directly
compare treatment effects over time (Table A.16). The treatment effects for the subsample of treated
subdistricts we observe twice are in line with the results from the overall sample.
24 This finding is in line with the evidence of constant and persistent effects of the PKH program on
child health, education, and the prevalence of child labor (Cahyadi et al., 2018).
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of treatment received by the subdistrict. Duration of receipt is not significantly related
to suicide rates, and barely affects the coefficient on whether a given subdistrict received
the program (Table A.18). We find comparable effect sizes for short-run and medium-run
effects of the program. This finding is inconsistent with a model of reference dependence
over past income levels which predicts declining effects on suicides as soon as people’s
reference point adjusts to the new income level.
[ Insert Figure 2]
3.4 Robustness: Outcome Definitions
One concern with our analysis could be that the definitions of the suicide rate change
over time. We provide three pieces of evidence that demonstrate the robustness of our
results to using less rich but time-invariant measures of subdistrict suicides.
First, we employ a measure of the suicide rate using the Poisson extrapolation de-
scribed in Section 2.3. Using this extrapolated suicide rate as the outcome for all years,
we see the same treatment effect patterns with similar effect sizes (Columns 1 to 5 of
Table A.4 and Figures A.6 and A.7). Second, we use a version of the suicide rate based
on the number of villages in a given subdistrict that report at least one suicide. This
is effectively a truncated version of our main outcome variable. Our treatment effect
estimates with this outcome definition remain largely unchanged (Columns 6 to 10 of
Table A.4). Third, we employ a binary variable indicating whether any suicide occurred
in a given subdistrict-year. The treatment effects are qualitatively similar to our main
specification (Columns 11 to 15 of Table A.4). Our preferred specification implies that
receiving the cash transfer reduces the likelihood of at least one suicide by 6 percentage
points or 12 percent. Thus, it seems that changes in the survey structure over time do
not affect our results.
Another concern could be that the cash transfer program affects migration patterns,
and thereby shapes our treatment effect estimates. To test whether these potential
changes in migration affect our results, we estimate treatment effects on two further out-
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comes not subject to this bias. The first one is the suicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants
using the 2005 population for all years. This definition of the suicide rate is unaffected
by changes in migration induced by the cash transfer. We find that with this measure
treatment effects on the suicide rate are still highly significant (Columns 1 to 5 of Table
A.5). The second alternative outcome variables is the number of suicides.25 Again, the
treatment effect patterns remain largely unchanged. The point estimate of our preferred
specification indicates that the cash transfer program decreased the number of suicides
per subdistrict by 0.2 (Column 11 of Table A.5). This set of results suggests that changes
in migration do not drive our main results.26
3.5 Agricultural Productivity Shocks and Suicides
The evidence from previous sections shows that a positive economic shock, namely the
receipt of a conditional cash transfer, can lower suicide rates. In this section, we examine
whether agricultural productivity shocks, as measured by rainfall, also affect suicide rates.
Advantages of Rainfall Analysis The rainfall analysis has at least two advantages
compared to the analysis of the cash transfer program: First, it enables us to examine
whether positive and negative income shocks have symmetric effects on the incidence of
suicide. Second, it allows us to retrieve estimates with no concerns regarding differential
social desirability bias between the treatment and the control group.27
Data Our empirical strategy relies on the following two facts: First, the agricultural
sector in Indonesia is to a large extent governed by seasonal monsoon rainfall. Second,
25 For this analysis we stick with the definition used for our main outcome variable and use the actual
number of suicides when available. The results remain very similar when we use the number of villages
with at least one suicide as the outcome (results available upon request).
26 The results for the RCT are also robust to changing outcome definitions, though the results are more
noisily measured (Tables A.10 and A.11).
27 One may be concerned that village heads whose villages are in receipt of the PKH program report
more favorable outcomes, but this critique does not apply to the rainfall analysis.
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Indonesian rainfall exhibits substantial variability within a given year across subdistricts,
as well as within subdistricts over time. To examine the causal effect of agricultural
productivity shocks, we leverage the ERA-Interim Reanalysis dataset which provides
precipitation data from 1979 until 2016 on a 0.25×0.25 degree resolution (roughly a
27.5×27.5 kilometer grid at the equator). We define rainfall at the subdistrict level as
the weighted average rainfall at the five grid points closest to the geometric center of the
subdistrict.28 Each grid point is weighted with the inverse of the squared distances to
the subdistrict center. Reanalysis data is based on a mix of real weather observations
(station and satellite data) and an atmospheric climate model. The main advantage of
reanalysis data is the homogeneous data quality across time and space, which alleviates
the concern of endogenous placement of weather stations. The rainfall data is matched
to the 2000 subdistrict boundaries. We use suicide data from the 2000, 2003, 2005, 2011
and 2014 waves of the Indonesian village census. As before, our main outcome variable
of interest, yst, is the suicide rate in a given subdistrict, s at time t.
Specification and Results We follow Maccini and Yang (2009) and calculate rainfall
in a particular year by focusing on rainfall in agricultural seasons (rather than in calendar
years). As in Maccini and Yang (2009) we define rainfall, zrainst, as the normalized
deviation of rainfall from the long-term mean within a given subdistrict.29 This measure
of rainfall has been shown to significantly and strongly predict rice output (Levine and
Yang, 2014). In all of our specifications we control for subdistrict level fixed effects, αs,
as well as time fixed effects, φt. As rainfall is heavily spatially correlated, we report
Conley (1999) standard errors allowing for arbitrary spatial and temporal correlation of
error terms in a 100km radius around the subdistrict center (we also report standard
28 We lack coordinates for 14 subdistricts. We use average rainfall and coordinates of other subdistricts
in the same district for these subdistricts. For one district all subdistricts have missing coordinates.
For those we use province level average rainfall and coordinates.
29 We use rainfall data from 1979 to 2016 to construct the subdistrict specific leave-one-out long-run
means and leave-one-out long-run standard deviations. As Indonesia is located around the equator,
temperature is relatively constant and therefore does not have effects on agricultural yields (Kleemans
and Magruder, forthcoming).
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errors clustered at the district level). We estimate the following equation, using the 2005
population to weight the subdistrict observations to make the analysis comparable to the
cash transfer estimates:
yst = γ1zrainst + αs + φt + εst (2)
Table 4 provides evidence that higher rainfall significantly reduces suicides. In Column
1 we show that increases in subdistrict-rainfall by one standard deviation from the long-
run subdistrict mean lowers the suicide rate by 0.08. In Column 3 we include subdistrict
trends, to rule out the possibility that differential trends can explain our findings. Our
results are virtually unchanged by the inclusion of trends and if anything become some-
what stronger.30 Column 5 assesses the sensitivity of our estimates by also controlling for
the first, second, and third lag of rainfall. This leaves our estimated coefficients largely
unaffected. Our estimated coefficients increase further both in economic and statistical
significance once we give equal weight to subdistricts, i.e. once we do not weight by
population size (see Table A.19).
[Insert Table 4]
Table A.20 tests whether the relationship between positive and negative rainfall shocks
and the suicide rate is approximately symmetric. To do so we augment the above equation
by two dummy variables: posshockst, taking value one for subdistricts experiencing a
positive shock in rainfall (top one third of the standardized rainfall distribution in our
sample) and negshockst, taking value one for districts experiencing a negative shock in
rainfall (one third percent of the standardized rainfall distribution in our sample). Then
we estimate the following equation:
yst = β1zrainst + β2posshockst + β3negshockst + αs + φt + εst (3)
30 We also estimate the impact of a linearly detrended (at the subdistrict level) measure of rainfall on
the suicide rate (Tables A.22 and A.23). The results are slightly weaker, but qualitatively in line with
the results from the main specification.
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We find little evidence of asymmetric responses to shocks. While the absolute value of the
point estimates for β2 are slightly larger than the estimates of β3, we cannot reject that
they are of equal size. In Figure 3 we non-parametrically assess the relationship between
rainfall and suicide. To do so, we partial out time fixed effects, subdistrict fixed effects,
and subdistrict-trends from both suicide rates and the rainfall measure. Then we use the
predicted residuals from these regressions to run local polynomial regressions between
these residuals. Figure 3 highlights a strong negative relationship between rainfall and
the suicide rate, confirming our previous result that the responses to positive and negative
rainfall shocks are fairly symmetric, and that the overall relationship is approximately
linear. However, at the top end of the rainfall distribution we observe a slight flattening
of the relationship consistent with a convex relationship between the suicide rate and
income.
[Insert Figure 3]
3.6 Cash Transfers and Agricultural Productivity Shocks
Do the cash transfers mitigate the adverse effects of agricultural productivity shocks on
suicides? If economic hardship caused by negative economic shocks affects suicide rates,
then we would expect cash transfers to more strongly reduce suicide rates in the face
of negative economic shocks. We test whether there are significant interactions between
receiving the cash transfer, Treatst, and rainfall, zrainst. We leverage the suicide data
from 2000 to 2014, and estimate the following equation, reporting Conley standard errors
and standard errors clustered at the district level:31
yst = γ1zrainst + γ2Treatst + γ3zrainst × Treatst + αs + φt + εst (4)
Our key coefficient of interest is γ3. Column 2 of Table 4 reveals that there is a significant
interaction effect, consistent with the idea that cash transfers are more (less) effective at
31 As in all other main specifications we use population size from 2005 to weight the observations.
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lowering suicides in years with lower (higher) agricultural productivity. Our estimates
imply that cash transfers lower suicides by 0.3 suicides per 100,000 inhabitants in a year
with subdistrict rainfall one standard deviation below its long-run mean, but only lower
suicides by 0.1 suicides per 100,000 inhabitants in a year with subdistrict rainfall one
standard deviation above its long-run mean.
These effects become slightly smaller and statistically insignificant, but remain eco-
nomically meaningful, once we control for subdistrict trends. This most likely reflects
the limited power for studying interaction effects after controlling for subdistrict trends.
The estimated effects of the interaction between the cash transfer and rainfall are much
stronger in specifications that do not use population weighting (see Table A.19). This
stems from the fact that rainfall more strongly impacts incomes in more rural subdis-
tricts which have a lower population size. We also analyze the effect of the cash transfer
separately for positive and negative rainfall shocks in Table A.21. While this analysis
is limited by lower statistical power, the estimates suggest that the cash transfer pro-
gram reduces the effects of both positive and negative agricultural productivity shocks
symmetrically.
The observed heterogeneity in treatment effects suggests that social welfare programs
can dampen the effects of negative and positive economic shocks. Put differently, the
cash transfer program breaks the relationship between agricultural productivity shocks
and suicides.32 The finding of a positive interaction effect between rainfall and the receipt
of the cash transfer suggests that the relationship between the suicide rate and income is
convex and not linear or concave.
Further Heterogeneity Do other covariates predict heterogeneous responses to the
cash transfer program? There is no statistically significant heterogeneity by any prede-
termined characteristics (fraction of farmers, fraction poor, per capita expenditure, per
capita crimes, per capita social institutions, and per capita health institutions; see Table
32 This interaction results also suggest that the effects of the cash transfer are not driven by differential
social desirability bias between the treatment and the control group.
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A.27). However, our effective statistical power to detect statistical differences in treat-
ment effects across groups is quite limited (see the minimum detectable effect sizes in
Table A.27).
4 Mechanism
In the next section we provide suggestive evidence in favor of depression as a channel
through which economic circumstances could affect people’s inclination to commit suicide.
In particular, we show that economic shocks directly affect a measure of depression in
line with the framework in Section 2.1. Finally, we examine the importance of several
potential subdistrict-level mediators.
Economic Shocks and Depression: Micro-Evidence To provide evidence that
economic circumstances may affect people’s inclination to commit suicide through changes
in mental health, we use unique individual-level data on depression from the Indonesian
Family Life Survey (IFLS). The IFLS waves 4 and 5 (in 2007 and 2014) administer a ten
question version of the CES-D depression scale (Radloff, 1997). Moreover, we use rich
data on household expenditure available for all five waves of the IFLS (1993, 1997, 2000,
2007, and 2014).
As in Section 3.5, we exploit agricultural productivity shocks to study the effects
of economic circumstances. We assess the effects of rainfall, zrainst, on depression,
depressionist, as measured by the CES-D score and monthly per captita household expen-
diture, expist, in levels and logs. Our object of interest are households with at least one
agricultural worker, the group of households whose income is most strongly dependent
on rainfall.33 We employ the same subdistrict-level rainfall measure as in Section 3.5,
33 Households count as “working in agriculture” if any household member works in agriculture either in
self-employment (without permanent employees), or as a casual or family worker in any of the five
IFLS waves. There is no sector information for IFLS Wave 1. We therefore use working “in self-
employment without permanent employees” or working as “temporary worker” as proxies. The sample
is restricted to individuals observed in all 5 IFLS waves.
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and also report both Conley standard errors and standard errors clustered at the district
level. We also include individual level fixed effects, αi, in our regression which allows us
to control for time-invariant individual-specific unobservables. Specifically, we estimate
the following equation:
yist = δ1zrainst + αi + φt + εist (5)
Table 5 shows that a one standard deviation increase in rainfall increases monthly per
capita consumption of farmers by 40,000 Rupiah (Column 1), monthly log consumption by
6.9 percent (Column 2)34, and decreases depression by 0.12 standard deviations (Column
3).35 Columns 4 to 6 of Table 5 also provide evidence that the rainfall shocks operate
through an economic mechanism by showing that both depression and consumption of
non-farmers do not respond to rainfall shocks. This suggests that our estimated effects on
depression do not operate through direct effects of weather on mental health. Indeed, the
coefficients on the effects of rainfall on log consumption and mental health are statistically
different between farmers and non-farmers (p ≤ 0.06).36 We also use the individual level
data to study heterogeneous effects of agricultural productivity shocks on depression.
We find that depression scores of individuals with higher baseline expenditure are more
strongly affected by rainfall shocks (Table A.24). This suggests a convex relationship
between depression and income and is consistent with the finding that cash transfers more
strongly reduce suicides in the presence of negative agricultural productivity shocks. The
effects are also significantly larger for women and below median age individuals.
[Insert Table 5]
34 A 6.9 percent increase over the median per-capita consumption across all years corresponds to ca.
18,000 Rupiahs or roughly 1.8 USD at 2005 prices.
35 We also find that individuals who received the PKH cash transfer by 2014 had higher depression scores
in 2007 (0.14 standard deviation; see Table A.25).
36 The difference in effects on consumption levels are marginally insignificant (p = 0.162).
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Mediation Analysis What other factors could account for the effects of the cash
transfer program on suicide rates? The cash transfer increased recipients’ welfare by
increasing their consumption and improving their health outcomes (World Bank, 2011).
Guided by this, we examine several potential subdistrict-level mediators including local
crime rates, health, and education institutions, and social organizations through which
the cash transfer program could lower the incidence of suicides. We therefore include
time-varying endogenous controls at the subdistrict level in our main specification of
interest. These controls could have been affected by the cash transfer in systematic ways
and therefore act as a channel through which our treatment effects operate. However,
we find little evidence that any subdistrict level institutions mediate our results. The
treatment effect estimates hardly move when the potential mediators are included (Table
A.26). This mediation analysis is limited by the fact that we have to rely on subdistrict
level mediators, and points to the importance of individual level mediators.
5 Interpreting Effect Sizes
The impact of cash transfers on suicides of cash transfer recipients is quantitatively very
large if we assume no spillovers in suicides. Spillovers similar to those identified in previous
work are consistent with moderately large direct effects. Implied direct per-dollar effects
of income on suicides identified using rainfall are significantly smaller than those from
cash transfers.
Cash Transfer Program There are two main factors to consider when calculating
the size of the cash transfer program on recipients. First, there is a strong economic
gradient in the suicide rate. The correlation between the fraction of individuals classified
as poor and the suicide rate is large and positive (see Section A.2). A 10% higher
share of the poor population is, on average, associated with a 0.14 higher suicide rate in
2005 (Table A.1). A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that poor individuals are
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2.24 times more likely to commit suicide than non-poor households.37 Second, there are
likely two types of spillover effects on non-treated individuals. The first is that suicides
are highly contagious (Hedstro¨m et al., 2008). Moreover, the conditional cash transfer
might have positive economic spill-overs to households not receiving the PKH program
(Angelucci and De Giorgi, 2009). Thus, we would expect that reducing suicides among
PKH recipients may also decrease suicides among non-recipients. Assuming no spillovers,
our preferred treatment effect estimate (0.36 suicides per 100,000 people) implies that
the suicide rate among the poor decreased by 89% of the implied mean suicide rate or
3.6 suicides per 100,000. This effect size would imply that the suicide rate among PKH
recipients who received the transfer is lower than the rate among non-recipients post-
treatment. Therefore, it may be more reasonable to calculate the implied suicide rate
reduction among PKH recipients assuming that the cash transfer equalized suicide rates
between poor and non-poor households. This yields an estimate of a direct treatment
effect of 58.7% of the implied control group mean for PKH recipients or 2.36 per 100,000
and an indirect effect of 0.12 for non-poor individuals (4.9% of the direct treatment
effect). Our estimated effect size of spillovers is modest compared to estimates from the
literature on suicide contagion (e.g. Hedstro¨m et al., 2008). We estimate that the program
prevented about 1065 suicides, i.e. one suicide for every 672,000 USD spent.
Agricultural Productivity Shocks To estimate the per-dollar effect size of agricul-
tural productivity shocks we use micro data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey. We
show that a one standard deviation change in rainfall induces a 6.9% change in monthly
per capita consumption for individuals in agricultural households (Table 5). This trans-
lates into a change of about 1.8 USD of monthly per capita consumption at the median
consumption level. This is equivalent to a yearly change in per capita expenditure of
21.6 USD at 2005 prices per one standard deviation change, a similar magnitude as the
annual cash transfer amount. We use this measure as our preferred dollar value to deal
with outliers in the consumption data which might strongly influence the level estimates.
37 For details for this and the following back of the envelope calculations see Section A.1.
29
Assuming no spillovers to non-farmers our estimates suggest that an increase in annual
per capita expenditure of 21.6 USD decreases the suicide rate by 7.4% of the implied
mean suicide rate for farmers across all periods or 0.14 per 100,000 farmers.
Effect Size Comparison Next, we compare the per-dollar impact of the cash transfer
program and of the agricultural productivity shocks. This comparison requires strong
assumptions, such as the baseline suicide rates of different groups of people. The implied
effect sizes in terms of percentage changes in the suicide rate for a 10 USD change in in-
come or consumption (assuming no spillovers) for the cash transfer program are roughly
twelve times larger than of those of rainfall shocks (twenty-five times larger in absolute
terms of the suicide rate). Extrapolating linearly, we find that an increase in the annual
per capita income or consumption by 10 USD decreased the suicide rate of poor indi-
viduals and farmers by 39.64% (1.61 suicides) or 3.34% (0.06 suicides), respectively. We
can reject the hypothesis of equality of the implied direct effect of the cash transfer and
the rainfall shocks in dollar terms (p<0.01). This finding implies that the income shock
targeted at initially poorer individuals was more effective, and is therefore consistent with
a convex relationship between the suicide rate and income.
The larger per-dollar impact of the cash transfer program compared to agricultural
productivity shocks of the same value is in line with the predictions outlined in Section
2.1. There are several reasons why the cash transfer could have larger effects. First,
the six year duration of the program substantially decreases uncertainty about future
income streams. Second, it is possible that program recipients expected that the cash
transfer may continue after the initial six year period, which would substantially increase
the expected net present value of the program. Third, the conditionalities of the cash
transfer may have an additional effect on mental health as they may induce more social
interactions and may relieve stress related to the children. Fourth, individuals classified
as poor have higher implied mean suicide rates than farmers. Thus, the cash transfer
program targeted a high risk population and, therefore, likely had a larger impact. Fifth,
we assume that all farmers are affected equally by rainfall, but there is a large degree
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of heterogeneity in how rainfall affects harvest depending, for example, on the type of
crop. Sixth, it is possible that the cash transfers have a direct psychological effect. They
may also act as a signal that the government may be willing to offer insurance from bad
outcomes more generally, thereby shifting recipients’ economic outlook.
6 Conclusion
We establish an important economic dimension in suicides. Using the nationwide roll-
out of a conditional cash transfer program and a randomized experiment of the same
program, we show that the program decreased suicides by approximately 0.36 per 100,000
inhabitants. We also show that agricultural productivity shocks, proxied by rainfall,
significantly affect suicide rates. A one standard deviation increase in rainfall lowers the
number of suicides per 100,000 inhabitants by approximately 0.08. Moreover, we establish
that cash transfers lower suicides most effectively in subdistricts experiencing negative
agricultural productivity shocks. This supports the idea that social welfare programs can
mitigate the adverse effects of negative economic shocks on mental health. Our evidence
points to an important role of government policies in alleviating the consequences of
poverty on mental health.
Using micro-data from the Indonesian Family Life Panel we show that economic shocks
may affect people’s inclination to commit suicide through mental health. However, under-
standing the exact mechanisms through which economic shocks ignite suicidal behavior
leaves ample scope for future research. We believe that there are several fruitful avenues
for future research. First, we need better micro-data on how economic circumstances
affect mental health, for example through elevated stress levels or the formation of eco-
nomic beliefs and preferences. Second, more research should be carried out to under-
stand which combination of economic and psychological interventions are best-suited to
increase mental health and prevent suicides. Third, we need a better understanding of
which populations should be targeted to increase mental health and lower suicide rates
most cost-effectively.
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7 Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics
Mean SD Median Min. Max. Obs.
Panel A: Population data
Suicide rate 1.39 2.14 0.65 0.00 64.52 3138
Any suicide 0.53 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 3138
Educ. institutions per 100,000 pop. 152.03 49.66 146.20 11.84 781.56 3138
Health institutions per 100,000 pop. 181.98 59.06 174.19 17.88 788.13 3138
% villages with asphalted road 0.72 0.32 0.83 0.00 1.00 3138
% villages with lighting 0.78 0.32 1.00 0.00 1.00 3138
% rural villages 0.74 0.40 1.00 0.00 1.00 3138
Number of villages 17.22 12.75 14.00 2.00 137.00 3138
Population size 56021.47 40427.31 47483.50 2371.00 415394.00 3138
Number of families 14089.84 9850.95 12182.00 540.00 90682.00 3138
Percentage farmers 56.84 30.97 67.17 0.00 100.00 3138
Panel B: Early adopters (2007-2011)
Suicide rate 1.31 1.86 0.55 0.00 14.31 713
Any suicide 0.54 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 713
Educ. institutions per 100,000 pop. 142.78 49.19 139.42 58.82 475.15 713
Health institutions per 100,000 pop. 173.71 53.78 170.60 17.88 480.05 713
% villages with asphalted road 0.77 0.30 0.92 0.00 1.00 713
% villages with lighting 0.86 0.27 1.00 0.00 1.00 713
% rural villages 0.73 0.41 1.00 0.00 1.00 713
Number of villages 14.03 7.36 13.00 3.00 77.00 713
Population size 63902.63 43381.55 53035.00 5594.00 314932.00 713
Number of families 15996.32 10030.36 13546.00 1523.00 68967.00 713
Percentage farmers 51.89 31.32 62.09 0.00 98.06 713
Panel C: RCT data
Suicide rate 1.41 1.98 0.63 0.00 14.50 310
Any suicide 0.52 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 310
Educ. institutions per 100,000 pop. 161.63 49.83 151.46 69.72 475.15 310
Health institutions per 100,000 pop. 181.80 43.36 176.57 82.88 504.15 310
% villages with asphalted road 0.70 0.29 0.79 0.00 1.00 310
% villages with lighting 0.78 0.32 0.98 0.00 1.00 310
% rural villages 0.90 0.27 1.00 0.00 1.00 310
Number of villages 16.74 6.85 16.00 3.00 46.00 310
Population size 81362.59 48613.68 66604.00 10116.00 260321.00 310
Number of families 15558.43 9121.26 13361.00 2345.00 68967.00 310
Percentage farmers 60.00 23.85 64.00 0.00 98.00 310
Table 1 displays summary statistics based on the Indonesia Village census 2005 . Observations are
weighted using the 2005 population except for number of villages, population size, and number of
families. Panel A shows summary statistics for the population of subdistricts in Indonesia. Panel
B shows summary statistics for subdistricts that received the conditional cash transfer program
between 2007 and 2011. Panel C shows summary statistics for the RCT sample.
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Table 2: Main results: roll-out
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Suicide rate
Treatment -0.358∗∗∗ -0.358∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗ -0.366∗∗∗ -0.267∗∗ -0.591∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.086) (0.110) (0.101) (0.115) (0.164)
Subdistrict FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cluster subdistrict N Y N N N N
Exclude RCT sample N N Y N N N
Include pre-treatment periods N N N Y Y N
Subdistrict trends N N N N Y N
Population weights Y Y Y Y Y N
Control mean (2011 & 2014) 2.016 2.016 2.033 2.016 2.016 2.721
N 9414 9414 8484 15690 15690 9414
Census waves 05-14 05-14 05-14 00-14 00-14 05-14
Table 2 displays the difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of the conditional cash
transfer program on the suicide rate. All specifications include year and subdistrict fixed
effects. Estimates are weighted using the 2005 population size unless otherwise noted.
Standard errors are clustered at district level unless otherwise noted. Column 2 reports
standard errors clustered at subdistrict level. Column 3 excludes the RCT sample (which
we employ in Table 3). Column 4 includes all pre-treatment periods. Column 5 further
includes subdistrict time-trends. Column 6 does not use 2005 population weights to
estimate treatment effects. The definition of the suicide rate per 100,000 people changes
slightly over time. In 2014 it is defined as the number of suicides and suicide attempts per
100,000. In 2011 it is defined as the number of suicides per 100,000. From 2000 to 2005
the suicide rate is defined as the number of villages in a given subdistrict with at least one
suicide per 100,000.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3: Main results: randomized experiment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: Suicide rate
Treatment -0.337 -0.258 -0.665∗∗ -0.665∗∗ -0.466 -1.064∗ -0.474
(0.266) (0.275) (0.318) (0.266) (0.334) (0.593) (0.325)
Subdistrict FE N N Y Y Y Y N
Time FE N N Y Y Y Y N
Cluster district N N N Y N N N
Include pre-treatment periods N N N N Y Y N
Subdistrict trends N N N N N Y N
Baseline suicide Y N N N N N Y
Population weights Y Y Y Y Y Y N
Control mean (2011) 1.774 1.774 1.774 1.774 1.774 1.774 2.058
N 310 310 620 620 1240 1240 310
Census waves 11 11 05-11 05-11 00-11 00-11 11
Table 3 displays the results of the RCT experiment. The suicide rate is defined as explained
in Table 2. Column 1 reports an ANCOVA specification using the 2011 suicide rates as the
outcomes and controlling for the 2005 suicide rate. Column 2 displays the treatment effect
estimate of a post comparison of treated and control subdistricts. Columns 3 to 6 report
difference-in-differences estimates of the treatment effect and control for both subdistrict and
time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the subdistrict level unless otherwise noted.
Estimates are weighted using population size from 2005 unless otherwise noted. In Column 3
we report the baseline difference-in-differences specification using data from 2005 and 2011.
Column 4 reports standard errors clustered at district level. Column 5 includes data from the
2003 and 2000 census waves. Column 6 further includes subdistrict specific time-trends on top
of subdistrict and time fixed effects. Column 7 shows the ANCOVA specification from Column
1 without population weights.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4: Interactions between agricultural productivity shocks and the cash transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Suicide rate
Rain (z-scored) -0.082∗ -0.112∗∗ -0.081∗ -0.106∗∗ -0.094∗ -0.129∗∗
(0.045) (0.050) (0.044) (0.048) (0.049) (0.054)
[0.039] [0.043] [0.038] [0.042] [0.039] [0.046]
Treat -0.216∗∗ -0.255∗∗ -0.193
(0.109) (0.101) (0.117)
[0.122] [0.115] [0.130]
Rain (z-scored)× Treat 0.118∗ 0.096 0.133∗
(0.072) (0.068) (0.079)
[0.070] [0.068] [0.077]
Subdistrict FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Subdistrict trends N N Y Y N N
Include lagged rainfall N N N N Y Y
N 15690 15690 15690 15690 15690 15690
Census waves 00-14 00-14 00-14 00-14 00-14 00-14
Table 4 displays the impact of rainfall on the suicide rate. The suicide rate is defined as explained
in Table 2. Odd columns report the impact of standardized rainfall on suicides. Even columns
include the treatment variable from the conditional cash transfer roll-out and the interaction with
rainfall. All specifications include subdistrict and year fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 control
for subdistrict time-trends. Columns 5 and 6 include the first, second and third lag of rainfall.
Parentheses report Conley (1999) standard errors, allowing for arbitrary time correlation and
two-dimensional spatial correlation within a 100 kilometre radius of the subdistrict centroid (used
for stars). Standard errors clustered at the district level are in square brackets. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5: Impact of rainfall on consumption and depression z-scores
Working in agriculture Not working in agriculture
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Per capita cons. Log per capita cons. Depression (z) Per capita cons. Log per capita cons. Depression (z)
Rain (z-scored) 39706.205∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ 11687.256 0.008 -0.008
(14587.567) (0.022) (0.042) (15481.365) (0.018) (0.050)
[9805.642] [0.019] [0.042] [14631.741] [0.017] [0.053]
Individual Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 12790 12790 5192 8356 8356 3420
IFLS waves used 1-5 1-5 4-5 1-5 1-5 4-5
Table 5 displays the impact of rainfall on monthly per-capita household consumption and depression z-scores in the Indonesian Family Life Survey
(IFLS). The sample is restricted to individuals tracked in all five waves of the IFLS. Columns 1 to 3 use a sample of individuals living in households
with at least one member working in agriculture (self-employed without or with temporary workers, or as casual or family workers) in any of the five
waves. IFLS wave 1 contains no coded sector information. Therefore, all individuals working as temporary workers or those who are self-employed
without permanent workers are counted as working in agriculture. Columns 4 to 6 use individuals from households without any agricultural worker (as
defined above). Per-capita household consumption is measured in Indonesian Rupiah. Consumption is deflated to 2005 levels. In 2005, 10,000 Rupiah
were roughly equivalent to 1 USD. Depression scores are measured using the 10 item CES-D scale (Radloff, 1997). All columns include individual and
time fixed effects. Parentheses report Conley (1999) standard errors, allowing for arbitrary time correlation and two-dimensional spatial correlation
within a 100 kilometre radius of the subdistrict centroid (used for stars). Standard errors clustered at the district level are in square brackets. Test
for equality of coefficients for individuals from agricultural households and individuals from non-agricultural households have the following p-values:
0.162, 0.006, and 0.06 for monthly consumption, log monthly consumption, and depression scores, respectively. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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8 Figures
Figure 1: Event-study: roll-out of conditional cash transfer program
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Notes: Figure 1 displays treatment effects relative to the timing of the introduction of the conditional
cash transfer program by treatment wave. The difference in the first period before the treatment are
normalized to zero. The displayed coefficients are the difference-in-differences treatment effect estimates
relative to subdistricts that had not received the treatment until 2013. All standard errors are clustered
at the district level. The vertical red line indicates the program start. The definition of the suicide rate
per 100,000 people changes slightly over time. In 2014 it is defined as the number of suicides and suicide
attempts per 100,000. In 2011 it is defined as the number of suicides per 100,000. From 2000 to 2005
the suicide rate is defined as the number of villages in a given subdistrict with at least one suicide per
100,000.
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Figure 2: Dynamics of treatment effects
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Notes: Figure 2 displays the treatment effects on the suicide rate relative to the year of introduction of the conditional
cash transfer program. The suicide rate is defined as in Figure 1. To estimate the coefficient for each year we use
different sub-samples of subdistricts. Treated subdistricts in a given period t are defined as having received the cash
transfer program exactly t before (or after) the census (e.g. to estimate the effect in year 1, we use observations
from the 2011 census subdistricts that received PKH in 2010 and observations of the 2014 census of subdistricts
first receiving the PKH in 2013). For t ≥ 0 control subdistricts are defined as subdistricts that had not received the
treatment at the time of census. For t < 0 control subdistricts are defined as not having received the treatment t
years after the census. Coefficients are obtained conditional on year and subdistrict fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the district level. The vertical red line indicates the program start. Differences two years before the
treatment are normalized to zero.
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Figure 3: Agricultural productivity shocks and suicides: Local Polynomial Regression
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Notes: Figure 3 displays a local polynomial regression of the residuals of the suicide rate and the residual
of standardized rainfall using PODES 2000, 2003, 2005, 2011 and 2014. Residuals are obtained from
a regression with time and subdistrict fixed effects and subdistrict time-trends. We employ population
weights from 2005 in our estimations. We employ an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.44. Top
and bottom percentile of the residual rainfall distribution are omitted, because of concerns about biased
estimates close to the limits (Li and Racine, 2006). The suicide rate is defined as described in Figure 1.
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Online Appendix: Income Shocks and Suicides:
Causal Evidence From Indonesia
Cornelius Christian, Lukas Hensel, and Christopher Roth
Summary of the Online appendix
The Appendix starts with detailing the calculations used to obtain the direct effect sizes
discussed in Section 5 of the paper.
In Section A.2 we present descriptive statistics. Table A.1 shows correlates of suicide
rates. Table A.2 shows evidence in favor of the integrity of the randomization. Section A.3
examines the sensitivity of our results from the difference-in-differences strategy. Table
A.3 provides further checks on the assumption that the timing of roll-out of the program
was quasi-random. Tables A.4 and A.5 examine robustness of the roll-out results to using
different definitions of the outcome variables. Table A.6 examine sensitivity of our results
to dropping partially treated subdistricts. Table A.7 shows the main roll-out results
without using population weights. Table A.8 shows the results using 2006 subdistrict
definitions. Table A.9 shows further robustness checks.
Section A.4 examines the sensitivity of the results from the randomized cash trans-
fer program. Tables A.10 and A.11 examine robustness of the RCT results to using
different definitions of the outcome variables. Table A.12 examines sensitivity of our
results to dropping partially treated subdistricts. Table A.13 shows the RCT results
without employing population weights. Table A.14 shows the results using 2006 subdis-
trict definitions. Finally, Table A.15 shows further robustness checks for the RCT results.
Section A.5 presents further analysis of the dynamics of treatment effects. Table A.16
present the results on “dynamic treatment effects” which using population weights. Table
A.17 present the results on “dynamic treatment effects” which does not apply population
weights. Table A.18 examines whether treatment effects vary with treatment intensity.
Section A.6 provides further robustness checks for the rainfall analysis. Table A.19
1
presents the main specifications without using population weights. Table A.20 examines
whether rainfall and suicide rates are symmetrically related. Table A.21 examines whether
the interaction of rainfall and conditional cash transfers are non-linearly related. Table
A.22 shows the main specification with rainfall detrended at the subdistrict level using
population weights. Table A.23 shows the main specification with rainfall detrended at
the subdistrict level without using population weights.
Section A.7 presents micro-evidence using the Indonesian Family Life Survey. Table
A.24 analyzes heterogeneous effect of rainfall shocks on depression symptoms by gender,
age, and baseline expenditures. Table A.25 examines whether PKH recipients have higher
depression scores before the receipt of the cash transfer program.
Section A.8 sheds further light on mechanisms. Table A.26 examines whether our
results are mediated by changes in crime rates, the quality of local institutions or social
capital. Table A.27 describes heterogeneous responses to the treatment.
Section B presents additional figures. Figure A.1 displays the evolution of mean suicide
rates over time for different treatment groups. Figure A.2 displays mean suicide rates
over time by treatment wave without applying population weights. Figure A.3 shows
the event-study analysis without applying population weights. Figure A.4 presents an
event-study analysis for our RCT sample with effects normalized relative to 2005. Figure
A.4 presents an event-study analysis for our RCT sample with effects normalized relative
to 2000. Figure A.4 presents an event-study analysis for our RCT sample. Figure A.6
displays mean suicide rates (based on a Poisson extrapolation) over time by treatment
wave. Finally, Figure A.7 showcases the event-study graph using the Poisson extrapolated
suicide rates.
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A Online Appendix
A.1 Effect Size Calculations
This section explains how we calculate the implied direct effect on cash transfer recipients
and farmers. This section is not meant to provide unambiguous estimates of direct effects,
but rather to provide a back of the envelope calculation based on several simplifying
assumptions. We conduct this analysis in the following steps for the cash transfer program
and agricultural productivity shocks.
1. Calculate the economic gradient of suicide rates.
2. Calculate the implied direct treatment effect on treated individuals.
3. Account for potential spillover effects of changing suicide rates.
A.1.1 The Cash Transfer Program
First, we calculate the economic gradient of the suicide rate with respect to being classified
as poor. We use this specification as a proxy for households eligible to receive PKH.1
Column 1 of Table A.1 suggests that a 10% higher share of the eligible household is, on
average, associated with a 0.142 higher suicide rate 2005 before the program was rolled
out. Assuming that this linear relationship between the fraction of poor individuals
and the suicide rate holds we can use the constant as the suicide rate for non-eligible
individuals (s¯non-elig = 1.15 ). The relationship between the share of eligible individuals
(xelig = 0.1) and the suicide rate is:
1.15 + 1.42 · xelig = (1− xelig) · 1.15 + xelig · s¯elig
1 We abstract from the fact that 15% of the population is classified as poor and assuming that 10%
of the population is poor and that only these 10% are eligible for treatment. If anything this would
make us underestimate the economic gradient between PKH recipient and non-recipients.
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From this we obtain the implied suicide rate for poor individuals s¯elig = 2.57. Thus,
we conclude that eligible individuals are 2.24 times more likely to commit suicide than
non-eligible individuals.
Second, we calculate the implied direct effect on eligible individuals assume that this
ratio of suicide rates for eligible and non-eligible individuals relationship remains the same
for 2011 and 2014 for non-treated subdistricts. As a first step, we calculate the implied
suicide rates for eligible and non-eligible individuals in 2011 and 2014. The control mean
(s¯control = 2.02) is equal to a weighted average of eligible and non-eligible individuals:
s¯control = 2.02 = 0.9 · snon-elig + 0.1 · 2.24 · snon-elig︸ ︷︷ ︸
selig
(6)
From this we obtain snon-elig = 1.80 and selig = 4.03. Next, we use the calculated suicide
rate in treated subdistricts s¯treat = 2.02 − 0.36 = 1.66 to calculate the implied direct
treatment effect on eligible individuals. Assuming no spillovers on untreated individuals
we obtain:
0.9 · 1.8 + 0.1 · (4.03 + ∆selig) = 1.66 (7)
.
This yields a direct treatment effect on PKH recipients as ∆selig = −3.6 or a reduction
of about 89% of the implied control suicide rate for eligible individuals.
These numbers imply that the suicide rate of eligible individuals receiving the cash
transfer would be reduced to levels below the suicide rate of non-eligible households.
Therefore, we conduct a further calculation allowing for the cash transfer program to
have positive spillovers on non-eligible individuals, in line with evidence on cash transfers
and suicides (Angelucci and De Giorgi, 2009; Hedstro¨m et al., 2008). Our benchmark
specification calibrates the strength of within subdistrict spill-overs such that the ex-post
suicide rates of eligible and non-eligible individuals in treated subdistricts is equalized.
We model the total treatment effect as consisting of a multiplier effect and a direct
treatment effect. This requires an assumption about the functional form of the multiplier.
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We assume that the suicide rate of non-PKH recipients in treated subdistricts is a function
of the direct treatment effect times a multiplier µ. The suicide rate in treated subdistricts
can then be written as:
s¯treat = 0.9 · (scontr,non-elig + µ(streat,elig − scontr,elig)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Spill-overs
) + 0.1 · streat,elig (8)
From this we can obtain the implied direct treatment effect on PKH recipients as:
∆selig = streat,elig − scontr,elig = s¯treat − 0.9 · scontr, non-elig − 0.1 · scontr,elig
0.9 · µ+ 0.1 (9)
Equation 9 confirms the intuition that the implied direct effect on poor individuals
decreases with size of the multiplier µ. Setting ex-post suicide rates for poor and non-
eligible individuals equal at the mean suicide rate in treated subdistricts of 1.66 suicides
per 100,000, we obtain a multiplier of µ = 0.049 and an implied direct effect on PKH
recipients of 2.36 per 100,000 or 58.7% of the implied control group mean.
Effect on number of suicides Our preferred estimate for the number of suicides is
Column 11 of Table A.5 which shows an average treatment effect of 0.2 suicides. In total,
there we observe 5324 subdistrict-years for treated subdistricts over time. Assuming
constant treatment effects over time, we calculate that the PKH program prevented 1065
suicides.
A.1.2 Rainfall
To calculate the effect size of agricultural productivity shocks, we conduct a similar
calculation.
First, we obtain the economic gradient of the suicide rate with the share of farmers
using the results from Column 2 of Table A.1. We observe that in 2005 an increase in
the share of farmer by 10% is associated with an increase in the suicide rate of 1.19. The
5
population weighted average share of farmers in 2005 is xfarm = 0.56.
2
We again use the constant as the suicide rate for non-farmers (s¯non-farm = 0.72 ). The
relationship between the share of farmers xfarm and the suicide rate is:
0.72 + 1.19 · xfarm = (1− xfarm) · 0.71 + xfarm · s¯farm
From this we obtain the implied suicide rate for farmers s¯farm = 1.91. Thus, farmers
are 2.67 time more likely to commit suicide than non-farmers households. The calculations
for the effect of rainfall are complicated by the fact that there is no clear control group.
Therefore, we use the population weighted mean suicide rate across all years (1.39 suicides
per 100,000). Assuming no spill-over effects, we then calculate the implied suicide rates
for farmers and non-farmers using the following equation:
s¯ = 1.39 = 0.44 · scontr,non-farm + 0.56 · 2.67 · scontr, non-farm︸ ︷︷ ︸
=scontr, farm
We obtain mean suicide rates of scontr, farm = 1.91 for farmers and scontr, non-farm = 0.72
for non-farmers
Based on these implied means we can then calculate the implied direct effect size as-
suming no spill-overs. The average effect of a one-standard deviation in rainfall according
to our preferred specification is −0.08. We obtain s¯treat = 1.31 by subtracting a one stan-
dard deviation treatment effect (0.08) from the population weighted mean suicide rate
across all years (1.39). We then use an analogue equation to the cash transfer calculations
to compute the implied direct effect:
s¯treat = 1.31 = 0.44 · scontr,non-farm + 0.56 · (scontr, farm + ∆sfarm)
With these assumptions, we obtain an implied direct effect size as ∆sfarm = −0.14
which is equivalent to 7.4 percent of the implied long-term mean for farmers. Allowing
2 We use the 2005 share to make the calculation comparable to the cash transfer calculations.
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for spillover with a multiplier in line with the cash transfer (0.049), the implied direct
treatment effect decreases to −0.047 suicides per 100,000 or 2.5 percent of the implied
long-term mean for farmers.
A.1.3 Calculating per-dollar impacts for implied direct effects
This section outlines how we calculate comparable monetary values for implied direct
effect of the cash transfer and agricultural productivity shocks. For this exercise, we
need to assume that the impact is linear in dollar amounts. For the cash transfer, we
estimate that 22.45 USD lower the suicide rate by 3.6 suicides per 100,000 or 89 percent,
so that 10 USD would lower the suicide rate by 1.61 suicides per 100,000 or 39.64 percent.
For agricultural productivity shocks, we estimate that a yearly per-capita consumption
increase by 21.6 USD reduces the suicide rate by 0.14 suicides per 100,000 or 7.4 percent.
This implies that 10 USD would reduce the suicide rate by 0.06 suicides per 100,000 or
3.34 percent.
7
Additional Tables
A.2 Descriptives
Table A.1: Correlates of the suicide rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Suicide rate
Fraction poor 1.422∗∗ -0.488 -0.155
(0.591) (0.721) (0.684)
Fraction farmers 1.194∗∗∗ 1.109∗∗∗ 0.692∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.168) (0.204)
Average HH expenditure (per capita) -0.273∗∗∗ -0.075 -0.063
(0.051) (0.067) (0.066)
Education (per capita) -0.000
(0.001)
Health facilities (per capita) 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001)
Social organisations (per capita) 0.000
(0.000)
Crime (per capita) 0.013∗∗∗
(0.003)
Constant 1.147∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗ 2.035∗∗∗ 1.024∗∗∗ 0.120
(0.114) (0.070) (0.144) (0.294) (0.348)
R2 0.006 0.030 0.017 0.030 0.066
N 3138 3138 3138 3138 3138
Census wave 05 05 05 05 05
Table A.1 shows correlates of the suicide rate per 100,000 individuals in 2005 with district and subdistrict
covariates. Our main outcome is the suicide rate per 100,000 individuals. Due to data constraints
its definition varies slightly over time. In 2014 it is defined as the number of suicides and suicide
attempts per 100,000. In 2011 it the number of suicides per 100,000. From 2000 to 2005 the suicide
rate is defined as the number of villages in a given subdistrict with at least one suicide per 100,000
population. The fraction of individuals below the poverty line (poor) and the average per-capita
household expenditure are measured at the district level. All other variables are measured at the
village level and aggregated to the subdistrict level. Share of population classified as poor or farmers
ranges from 0 to 1. Column 5 further includes per capita educational institutions, per capita health
institutions, per capita social organizations, and crime rates. Regressions weighted by subdistrict popula-
tion in 2005. Standard errors clustered at district level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.2: Baseline balance: randomized experiment
Treatment Control ∆ se(∆) p(∆=0)
Suicide rate 1.719 1.337 0.386 (0.282) 0.173
Any suicide 0.468 0.427 0.040 (0.059) 0.504
Education institutions per capita 91.763 91.713 -0.085 (5.338) 0.987
Health institutions per capita 100.784 100.573 0.401 (5.998) 0.947
% villages with asphalted road 0.651 0.662 -0.013 (0.037) 0.731
% villages with lighting 0.786 0.732 0.051 (0.040) 0.207
% rural villages 0.950 0.925 0.026 (0.026) 0.323
Number of villages 16.144 15.979 0.219 (0.783) 0.779
Population size 55811.295 54974.091 760.818 (3669.322) 0.836
Number of families 14758.525 14510.671 231.873 (927.610) 0.803
Percentage of farmers 68.063 68.620 -0.498 (2.524) 0.844
N 167 143 310 310 310
Table A.2 compares population weighted baseline covariates of the RCT sample using the 2005
village census. The suicide rate is defined as described in Table A.1. P-values are based on
standard errors clustered at the subdistrict level. Test for joint significance of differences between
the treatment and control group is not rejected (p=0.57).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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A.3 Further sensitivity - Roll-Out of Cash Transfer Program
Table A.3: Roll-out identification: regression tests
(1) (2)
∆ Suicide rate Suicide rate
Treatment wave 1: 07-11 -0.002
(0.063)
Treatment wave 2: 12-13 0.028
(0.064)
Treatment -0.399∗∗∗
(0.121)
Include pre treatment dummy N Y
N 6276 15690
Census waves 00-05 00-14
Table A.3 displays two tests in support of the identification assumptions
for the main roll-out specification. Column 1 presents a test for whether
the timing of the entry into the program correlates with pre-trends. The
dependent variable is changes in the suicide rate between rounds. The sample
in Column 1 is restricted to pre-treatment periods. Column 2 displays a test
for whether the treatment effect is driven by changes in the suicide rates
right before the introduction of the treatment. It shows the treatment effect
on the suicide rate controlling for an indicator variable for the period prior
to treatment. The suicide rate is defined as described in Table A.1. All
specifications include time and subdistrict fixed effects and are weighted by
2005 population. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.4: Roll-out: additional outcome definitions 1
Suicide rate (extrapolated - Poisson) Suicide rate (truncated) Any Suicide
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Treatment -0.298∗∗∗ -0.474∗∗∗ -0.313∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗ -0.240∗∗ -0.268∗∗∗ -0.418∗∗∗ -0.282∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗ -0.068∗∗
(0.096) (0.154) (0.103) (0.087) (0.113) (0.081) (0.132) (0.088) (0.076) (0.097) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.020) (0.028)
Subdistrict FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Exclude RCT sample N N Y N N N N Y N N N N Y N N
Include pre-treatment periods N N N Y Y N N N Y Y N N N Y Y
Subdistrict trends N N N N Y N N N N Y N N N N Y
Population weight Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y N N N
Control Mean (2011 & 2014) 1.750 1.750 1.767 1.750 1.750 1.615 1.615 1.629 1.615 1.615 0.547 0.547 0.546 0.547 0.547
N 9414 9414 8484 15690 15690 9414 9414 8484 15690 15690 9414 9414 8484 15690 15690
Census waves 05 - 14 05 - 14 05 - 14 00 - 14 00 - 14 05 - 14 05 - 14 05 - 14 00 - 14 00 - 14 05 - 14 05 - 14 05 - 14 00 - 14 00 - 14
Table A.4 displays the difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of the conditional cash transfer program on three alternative outcomes.
Specifications use population weights unless otherwise noted. Columns 1 to 5 show treatment effects on the Poisson-extrapolated suicide rate
(extrapolated from the subdistrict average of village-level incidences of at least one suicide in a given year). Columns 6 to 10 report the effects on a
truncated version of the suicide rate based on the number of villages with at least one suicide in a subdistrict. Columns 11 to 15 report the treatment
effect on a binary variable equal to one if there was at least one suicide in a subdistrict last year. All specifications include year and subdistrict fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at district level. Column 2, 7, and 12 do not employ population weights. Columns 3, 8, and 13 exclude the RCT
sample. Columns 4, 9, and 14 include all pre-treatment periods. Columns 5, 10, and 15 additionally include subdistrict time-trends. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.5: Roll-out: additional outcome definitions 2
Suicide rate (2005 population) Number of suicides (extrapolated - Poisson) Number of suicides
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Treatment -0.452∗∗∗ -0.833∗∗∗ -0.484∗∗∗ -0.475∗∗∗ -0.319∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗
(0.109) (0.163) (0.119) (0.113) (0.117) (0.053) (0.086) (0.057) (0.044) (0.067) (0.055) (0.084) (0.060) (0.050) (0.091)
Subdistrict FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Exclude RCT sample N N Y N N N N Y N N N N Y N N
Include pre-treatment periods N N N Y Y N N N Y Y N N N Y Y
Subdistrict trends N N N N Y N N N N Y N N N N Y
Population weight Y N Y Y Y N Y N N N N Y N N N
Conrol mean (2011 & 2014) 2.226 2.226 2.041 2.226 2.226 0.920 1.127 0.922 0.920 0.920 1.061 1.318 1.326 1.061 1.061
N 9414 9414 8484 15690 15690 9414 9414 8484 15690 15690 9414 9414 8484 15690 15690
Census waves 05 - 14 05 - 14 05 - 14 00 - 14 00 - 14 05 - 14 05 - 14 05 - 14 00 - 14 00 - 14 05 - 14 05 - 14 05 - 14 00 - 14 00 - 14
Table A.5 displays the difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of the conditional cash transfer program on three alternative outcomes.
Specifications use population weights unless otherwise noted. Columns 1 to 5 show treatment effects on the suicide rate based on 2005 population
numbers. Columns 6 to 10 report the effects on the Poisson extrapolated number of suicides (extrapolated from the subdistrict average of village-level
incidences of at least one suicide in a given year). Columns 11 to 15 report the treatment effect on the number of suicides used to construct our main
suicide rate. All specifications include year and subdistrict fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at district level. Column 2, 7, and 12 do not
employ population weights. Columns 3, 8, and 13 exclude the RCT sample. Columns 4, 9, and 14 include all pre-treatment periods. Columns 5, 10,
and 15 additionally include subdistrict time-trends. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.6: Roll-out: drop partially treated
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Suicide rate
Treatment -0.336∗∗∗ -0.336∗∗∗ -0.358∗∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗ -0.442∗∗ -0.582∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.087) (0.112) (0.103) (0.180) (0.169)
Subdistrict FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cluster subdistrict N Y N Y N N
Exclude RCT sample N N Y N N N
Include pre-treatment periods N N N Y N N
Subdistrict Trends N N N N Y N
Population weights Y Y Y Y Y N
Control mean (2011 & 2014) 2.016 2.016 2.033 2.016 2.016 2.391
N 8454 8454 7686 14090 14090 8454
Census waves 05-14 05-14 05-14 00-14 00-14 05-14
Table A.6 displays the difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of the conditional cash transfer
on the suicide rate excluding partially treated subdistricts. The suicide rate is defined as described in
Table A.1. All specifications use population weights from 2005 unless otherwise noted. All specifications
include year and subdistrict fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at district level unless noted
differently. Column 2 report standard errors clustered at subdistrict level. Column 3 excludes the RCT
sample. Column 4 includes all pre-treatment periods. Column 5 further includes subdistrict time-trends.
Column 6 does not use population weights. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.7: Main results: roll-out - not population-weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Suicide rate
Treatment -0.591∗∗∗ -0.591∗∗∗ -0.633∗∗∗ -0.638∗∗∗ -0.428∗∗
(0.164) (0.143) (0.179) (0.158) (0.174)
Subdistrict FE Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y
Cluster subdistrict N Y N Y N
Exclude RCT sample N N Y N N
Include pre-treatment periods N N N Y Y
Subdistrict trends N N N N Y
Control mean (2011 & 2014) 2.950 2.950 2.983 2.950 2.950
N 9414 9414 8484 15690 15690
Census waves 05-14 05-14 05-14 00-14 00-14
Table A.7 displays the difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the conditional
cash transfer program on the suicide rate without using population weights. The suicide
rate is defined as described in Table A.1. All specifications include year and subdistrict
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level unless noted differently.
Column 2 reports standard errors clustered at the subdistrict level. Column 3 excludes the
RCT sample. Column 4 includes all pre-treatment periods. Column 5 additionally includes
subdistrict time-trends. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.8: Main results: roll-out - 2006 subdistrict boundaries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Suicide rate
Treatment -0.264∗∗∗ -0.264∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗ -0.347∗
(0.102) (0.088) (0.110) (0.180)
Subdistrict FE Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y
Cluster subdistrict N Y N N
Exclude RCT sample N N Y N
Population weights Y Y Y N
Control mean (2011 & 2014) 2.170 2.170 2.183 3.046
N 14522 14522 13469 14522
Census waves 05-14 05-14 05-14 05-14
Table A.8 displays the difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the conditional
cash transfer program on the suicide rate in subdistricts according to 2006 boundaries using
population weights (unless otherwise noted). The suicide rate is defined as described in
Table A.1. All specifications include year and subdistrict fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the district level. Column 2 reports standard errors clustered at the subdistrict
level. Column 3 excludes the RCT sample. Column 4 does not employ population weights.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.9: Main results: roll-out - additional robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Suicide rate
Treatment -0.359∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗ -0.393∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.103) (0.121) (0.106)
Subdistrict FE N Y N N
Time FE Y Y Y Y
District FE Y N N N
District trends N Y N N
Baseline controls N N Y Y
Baseline controls × Post N N N Y
Population weights Y Y Y Y
Control mean (2011 & 2014) 2.016 2.016 2.033 2.016
N 9414 9414 8484 9414
Census waves 05-14 05-14 05-14 05-14
Table A.9 displays estimates of the effect of the conditional cash transfer program on the
suicide rate using the 2005 population weights. The suicide rate is defined as described in
Table A.1. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. Column 1 uses district instead
of subdistrict fixed effects. Column 2 controls for district specific time trends. Column 3
includes baseline covariates instead of subdistrict fixed effects. Controls include per capita
health, education, and social institutions as well as the fraction of farmers, fraction of
individuals classified as poor, per-captita expenditure levels, and crime rates. Column 4
further includes interactions of these variable with time trends. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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A.4 Further sensitivity - Cash Transfer Program - RCT
Table A.10: Randomized experiment - alternative outcomes 1
Suicide rate (extrapolated - Poisson) Suicide rate (truncated) Any Suicide
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Treatment -0.236 -0.160 -0.633∗∗ -0.244 -0.318 -0.225 -0.192 -0.562∗∗ -0.224 -0.306 -0.096 -0.084 -0.142 -0.078 -0.086
(0.227) (0.234) (0.305) (0.224) (0.294) (0.206) (0.253) (0.272) (0.203) (0.266) (0.066) (0.067) (0.086) (0.066) (0.059)
Subdistrict FE N N Y Y N N N Y Y N N N Y Y N
Time FE N N Y Y N N N Y Y N N N Y Y N
Include pre-treatment periods N N N Y N N N N Y N N N N Y N
Baseline suicide Y N N N Y Y N N N Y Y N N N Y
Population weights Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
Control mean (2011) 1.514 1.514 1.514 1.514 1.775 1.420 1.420 1.420 1.420 1.666 0.578 0.578 0.578 0.578 0.545
N 310 310 620 1240 310 310 310 620 1240 310 310 310 620 1240 310
Census waves 11 11 05 - 11 00 - 11 11 11 11 05 - 11 00 - 11 11 11 11 05 - 11 00 - 11 11
Table A.10 displays RCT treatment effects on three alternative outcomes. All specifications use population weights unless otherwise noted. Columns
1 to 5 show treatment effects on the Poisson-extrapolated suicide rate (extrapolated from the subdistrict average of village-level incidences of at least
one suicide in a given year). Columns 6 to 10 report the effects on a truncated version of the suicide rate based on the number of villages with at
least one suicide in a subdistrict. Columns 11 to 15 report the treatment effect on a binary variable equal to one if there was at least one suicide in a
subdistrict last year. Columns 1, 6, and 11 report an ANCOVA specification. In Column 2, 7, and 12 we report treatment effect estimates of a post
comparison of treated and control subdistricts. Columns 3, 8, and 13 report difference-in-differences estimates of the treatment effect. In Columns 4,
9, and 14 we report difference-in-differences results including all pre-treatment time periods. In Columns 5, 10, and 15 we report ANCOVA estimates
without using baseline population weights. Standard errors are clustered at subdistrict level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.11: Randomized experiment - alternative outcomes 2
Suicide rate (2005 population) Number of suicides (extrapolated - Poisson) Number of suicides
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Treatment -0.344 -0.256 -0.663∗∗ -0.313 -0.483 -0.099 -0.129 -0.345∗∗ -0.118 -0.170 -0.149 -0.129 -0.365∗∗ -0.167 -0.232
(0.281) (0.293) (0.328) (0.280) (0.340) (0.133) (0.164) (0.171) (0.131) (0.182) (0.161) (0.164) (0.183) (0.157) (0.250)
Subdistrict FE N N Y Y N N N Y Y N N N Y Y N
Time FE N N Y Y N N N Y Y N N N Y Y N
Include pre-treatment periods N N N Y N N N N Y N N N N Y N
Baseline suicide Y N N N Y Y N N N Y Y N N N Y
Population weights Y Y Y Y N N N N N Y N N N N Y
Control mean (2011) 1.883 1.883 1.883 1.883 2.167 0.878 0.878 0.878 0.878 1.014 1.035 1.035 1.035 1.035 1.228
N 310 310 620 1240 310 310 310 620 1240 310 310 310 620 1240 310
Census waves 11 11 05 - 11 00 - 11 11 11 11 05 - 11 00 - 11 11 11 11 05 - 11 00 - 11 11
Table A.11 displays RCT treatment effects on three alternative outcomes. Specifications use population weights unless otherwise noted. Columns
1 to 5 show treatment effects on the suicide rate based on 2005 population numbers. Columns 6 to 10 report the effects the Poisson extrapolated
number of suicides (extrapolated from the subdistrict average of village-level incidences of at least one suicide in a given year). Columns 11 to 15
report the treatment effect on the number of suicides used to construct our main suicide rate. Columns 1, 6, and 11 report an ANCOVA specification.
In Column 2, 7, and 12 we report treatment effect estimates of a post comparison of treated and control subdistricts. Columns 3, 8, and 13 report
difference-in-differences estimates of the treatment effect. In Columns 4, 9, and 14 we report difference-in-differences results including all pre-treatment
time periods. In Columns 5, 10, and 15 we report ANCOVA estimates without using baseline population weights. Standard errors are clustered at
subdistrict level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.12: Randomized experiment - drop partially treated
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: Suicide rate
Treatment -0.326 -0.238 -0.640∗∗ -0.640∗∗ -0.453 -1.041∗ -0.467
(0.267) (0.276) (0.318) (0.261) (0.334) (0.593) (0.325)
Subdistrict FE N N Y Y Y Y N
Time FE N N Y Y Y Y N
Cluster district N N N Y N N N
Include pre-treatment periods N N N N Y Y N
Subdistrict trends N N N N N Y N
Baseline suicide Y N N N N N Y
Population weight Y Y Y Y Y Y N
Control mean (2011) 1.774 1.774 1.774 1.774 1.774 1.774 2.058
N 282 282 564 564 1128 1128 282
Census waves 11 11 05-11 05-11 00-11 00-11 11
Table A.12 reports the RCT effects on the suicide rate excluding partially treated subdistricts.
All specifications use population weights from 2005 unless otherwise noted. The suicide rate is
defined as described in Table A.1. Column 1 reports an ANCOVA specification controlling for
the 2005 suicide rate. Column 2 displays the treatment effect estimate of a post comparison of
treated and control subdistricts. Columns 3 to 6 report difference-in-differences estimates of the
treatment effect. Standard errors are clustered at the subdistrict level unless otherwise noted. In
Column 3 we control for time fixed effects as well as subdistrict fixed effects. Column 4 reports
standard errors clustered at district level. Column 5 includes data from the 2003 and 2000 census
waves. Column 6 further includes subdistrict specific time-trends on top of subdistrict and time
fixed effects. Column 7 shows the ANCOVA specification without population weights.∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.13: Main results: randomized experiment - without population weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Suicide rate
Treatment -0.474 -0.258 -0.809∗∗ -0.809∗∗ -0.466 -1.302∗
(0.325) (0.275) (0.401) (0.315) (0.334) (0.726)
Subdistrict FE N N Y N Y Y
Time FE N N Y Y Y Y
Cluster district N N N Y N N
Include pre-treatment periods N N N N Y Y
Subdistrict trends N N N N N Y
Baseline suicide Y N N N N N
Population weights N N N N N N
Control mean (2011) 2.058 2.058 2.058 2.058 2.058 2.058
N 310 310 620 620 1240 1240
Census waves 11 11 05-11 05-11 00-11 00-11
Table 3 displays the results of the RCT experiment without population weights. The suicide rate
is defined as described in Table A.1. Column 1 reports an ANCOVA specification controlling for
the 2005 suicide rate. Column 2 displays the treatment effect estimate of a post comparison of
treated and control subdistricts. Columns 3 to 6 report difference-in-differences estimates of the
treatment effect. Standard errors are clustered at the subdistrict level unless otherwise noted.
Estimates are weighted using population size from 2005 unless otherwise noted. In Column 3 we
control for time fixed effects as well as subdistrict fixed effects. Column 4 reports standard errors
clustered at district level. Column 5 includes data from the 2003 and 2000 census waves. Column
6 further includes subdistrict specific time trends on top of subdistrict and time fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered at the subdistrict level in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.14: Main results: randomized experiment - 2006 boundaries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Suicide rate
Treatment -0.248 -0.192 -0.544∗ -0.544∗ -0.537
(0.256) (0.263) (0.309) (0.294) (0.383)
Subdistrict FE N N Y Y N
Time FE N N Y Y N
Cluster district N N N Y N
Baseline suicide Y N N N Y
Population weights Y Y Y Y N
Control mean (2011) 1.720 1.720 1.720 1.720 2.205
N 351 351 702 702 351
Census waves 11 11 05-11 05-11 11
Table A.14 displays the results of the RCT experiment on the suicide rate according to 2006
subdistrict boundaries with 2005 population weights unless otherwise noted. The suicide
rate is defined as described in Table A.1. Standard errors are clustered at subdistrict level
unless noted otherwise. Column 1 reports an ANCOVA specification controlling for the
2005 suicide rate. Column 2 displays the treatment effect estimate of a post comparison of
treated and control subdistricts. Columns 3 and 4 report difference-in-differences estimates
of the treatment effect. In Column 3 we control for time fixed effects as well as subdistrict
fixed effects. Column 4 reports standard errors clustered at district level. Column 5 reports
the ANCOVA specification without population weights. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.15: Main results: randomized experiment - additional robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Suicide rate
Treatment -0.665∗∗ -0.649∗∗ -0.809∗∗ -0.665∗∗
(0.330) (0.272) (0.405) (0.321)
Subdistrict FE N Y N N
Time FE Y Y Y Y
District FE Y N N N
District trends N Y N N
Baseline controls N N Y Y
Baseline controls × Post N N N Y
Population weights Y Y Y Y
Control mean (2011) 1.774 1.774 1.774 1.774
N 620 620 620 620
Census waves 05-11 05-11 05-11 05-11
Table A.15 displays the results using the RCT experiment on the suicide rate with
population weights. The suicide rate is defined as described in Table A.1. Columns 1 to
4 report difference-in-differences estimates of the treatment effect. Column 1 uses district
instead of subdistrict fixed effects, while also controlling for treatment status. Column 2
controls for district specific time trends. Column 3 includes baseline covariates instead
of subdistrict fixed effects. Controls include per capita health, education, and social
institutions as well as the fraction of farmers, fraction of individuals classified as poor,
per-captita expenditure levels, and crime rates. Column 4 further includes interactions of
these variable with time trends. Standard errors clustered in subdistrict level in parenthesis.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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A.5 Dynamics of treatment effects
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Table A.16: Dynamics of treatment effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RCT Treat 07-08 Treat 10-11 Treat 12-13
Dependent variable: Suicide rate
Panel A: First post treatment census wave
Treatment -0.665∗∗ -0.509∗∗∗ -0.289 -0.280∗
(0.318) (0.136) (0.175) (0.156)
Years since launch of PKH 3-4 3-4 0-1 1-2
Census waves 05 & 11 05 & 11 05 & 11 11 & 14
Number of treated 167 621 233 1137
Number of counterfactuals 143 1186 1186 1186
Receiving Treatment Y Y Partial Y
Panel B: Second post treatment census wave
Treatment -0.273 -0.433∗∗ -0.540∗∗
(0.371) (0.207) (0.237)
Years since launch of PKH 6-7 6-7 3-4
Census waves 05 & 14 05 & 14 05 & 14
Number of treated 167 621 233
Number of counterfactuals 143 1186 1186
Receiving treatment Partial Partial Y
Table A.16 displays treatment effects on the suicide rate for each treatment wave relative to
never treated subdistricts. The suicide rate is defined as explained in Table A.1. Estimates
are weighted using 2005 population size. Panel A shows treatment effects in the first
PODES survey after subdistricts started receiving the conditional cash transfer program.
Panel B shows treatment effects in the second PODES survey after subdistricts started
receiving the program. Impacts in Columns 1 and 2 report treatment effect estimates past
the six year duration of the program. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.17: Dynamics of treatment effects: not population-weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RCT Treat 07-08 Treat 10-11 Treat 12-13
Dependent variable: Suicide rate
Panel A: First post treatment census wave
Treatment -0.809∗∗ -0.612∗∗∗ -0.162 -0.628∗∗
(0.401) (0.173) (0.302) (0.259)
Years since launch of PKH 3-4 3-4 0-1 1-2
Census waves 05 & 11 05 & 11 05 & 11 11 & 14
Number of treated 167 621 233 1137
Number of counterfactuals 143 1186 1186 1186
Receiving Treatment Y Y Partial Y
Panel B: Second post treatment census wave
Treatment -0.017 -0.629∗∗ -0.733∗
(0.486) (0.305) (0.440)
Years since launch of PKH 7-8 7-8 3-4
Census waves 05 & 14 05 & 14 05 & 14
Number of treated 167 621 233
Number of counterfactuals 143 1186 1186
Receiving treatment Partial Partial Y
Table A.17 displays treatment effects for each treatment wave relative to subdistricts who
did not receive the treatment until 2013 without using population weights. The suicide rate
is defined as described in Table A.1. Panel A shows treatment effects in the first PODES
survey after subdistricts started receiving the conditional cash transfer program. Panel B
shows treatment effects in second PODES survey after subdistricts started receiving the
program. Impacts in Columns 1 and 2 report treatment effect estimates past the six year
duration of the program. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.18: Roll-out effects: treatment intensity
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: Suicide rate
Treatment -0.358∗∗∗ -0.336∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.101)
Intensity -0.012
(0.024)
N 9414 9414
Census Waves 05-14 05-14
Table A.18 displays treatment effects on the suicide rate controlling for treatment duration in years
since start of the program. The suicide rate is defined as described in Table A.1. All specifications
include time and subdistrict fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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A.6 Rainfall
Table A.19: Interactions between agricultural productivity shocks and the cash transfers
- not population weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Suicide rate
Rain (z-scored) -0.145∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.061) (0.051) (0.053) (0.055) (0.064)
[0.059] [0.065] [0.050] [0.053] [0.056] [0.066]
Treat -0.233 -0.223 -0.163
(0.151) (0.171) (0.157)
[0.161] [0.185] [0.171]
Rain (z-scored)× Treat 0.314∗∗∗ 0.200∗ 0.361∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.109) (0.117)
[0.105] [0.119] [0.117]
Subdistrict FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Subdistrict trends N N Y Y N N
Include lagged rainfall N N N N Y Y
N 15690 15690 15690 15690 15690 15690
Census waves 00-14 00-14 00-14 00-14 00-14 00-14
Table A.19 displays the impact of rainfall on suicides. The suicide rate is defined as described in
Table A.1. Odd columns report the impact of standardized rainfall on suicides. Even columns
include the treatment variable from the conditional cash transfer roll-out and the interaction with
rainfall. All specifications include subdistrict and year fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 additionally
control for subdistrict time trends. Columns 5 and 6 also include the first, second and third lag of
rainfall. Parentheses report Conley (1999) standard errors, allowing for arbitrary time correlation
and two-dimensional spatial correlation within a 100 kilometre radius of the subdistrict centroid
(used for stars). Standard errors clustered at the district level are in square brackets.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.20: Rainfall: symmetry of effects
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Suicide rate
Rain (z-scored) 0.025 -0.004 0.025
(0.062) (0.059) (0.061)
[0.058] [0.058] [0.056]
Positive Shock -0.201∗∗ -0.149∗ -0.224∗∗
(0.096) (0.090) (0.090)
[0.065] [0.063] [0.067]
Negative Shock 0.124 0.077 0.140
(0.105) (0.101) (0.102)
[0.089] [0.088] [0.089]
p(|Positive Shock| = |Negative Shock| ) 0.598 0.613 0.551
Subdistrict FE Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y
Subdistrict trends N Y N
Include lagged rainfall N N Y
N 15690 15690 15690
Census waves 00-14 00-14 00-14
Table A.20 displays the impact of non-linear measures of rainfall on the suicide
rate. The suicide rate is defined as described in Table A.1. The Table reports
the results of a regression of standardized rainfall and dummies indicating
rainfall above the 66th and below the 33th percentile of z-scored rainfall in our
sample. All specifications include subdistrict and year fixed effects. Column 2
also controls for subdistrict specific time trends. Column 3 includes the first,
second and third lag of rainfall. Parentheses report Conley (1999) standard
errors, allowing for arbitrary time correlation and two-dimensional spatial
correlation within a 100 kilometre radius of the subdistrict centroid (used for
stars). Standard errors clustered at the district level are displayed in square
brackets.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.21: Rainfall: non-linear interaction of rainfall and cash transfer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Suicide rate
Positive shock -0.181∗∗ -0.178∗∗ -0.152∗ -0.151∗ -0.201∗∗ -0.202∗∗
(0.084) (0.085) (0.080) (0.080) (0.081) (0.083)
[0.054] [0.054] [0.053] [0.053] [0.059] [0.059]
Positive shock × Treat 0.406 0.253 0.502
(0.508) (0.402) (0.517)
[0.529] [0.468] [0.551]
Negative shock 0.099 0.156 0.092 0.119 0.125 0.166∗
(0.096) (0.100) (0.090) (0.094) (0.093) (0.099)
[0.071] [0.073] [0.069] [0.071] [0.070] [0.073]
Negative shock × Treat -0.195 -0.115 -0.165
(0.138) (0.126) (0.138)
[0.073] [0.071] [0.073]
Treat -0.223∗ -0.295∗∗∗ -0.244∗∗
(0.121) (0.101) (0.121)
[0.121] [0.113] [0.120]
Subdistrict FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Subdistrict trends N N Y Y N N
Include lagged rainfall N N N N Y Y
N 15690 15690 15690 15690 15690 15690
Census waves 00-14 00-14 00-14 00-14 00-14 00-14
Table A.21 displays the impact of non-linear measures of rainfall on the suicide
rate. The suicide rate is defined as described in Table A.1. The Table reports the
results of a regression of dummies indicating rainfall above the 66th and below the
33th percentile of z-scored rainfall in our sample. Even columns also display the
interaction with receiving the conditional cash transfer. All specifications include
subdistrict and year fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 also control for subdistrict specific
time trends. Columns 5 and 6 includes the first, second and third lag of z-scored
rainfall. Parentheses report Conley (1999) standard errors, allowing for arbitrary
time correlation and two-dimensional spatial correlation within a 100 kilometre
radius of the subdistrict centroid (used for stars). Standard errors clustered at the
district level are displayed in square brackets.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.22: Interactions between agricultural productivity shocks and the cash transfers
- detrended rainfall and population weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Suicide rate
Rain (z-scored) -0.097∗∗ -0.112∗∗ -0.091∗∗ -0.102∗∗ -0.104∗∗ -0.125∗∗
(0.043) (0.046) (0.041) (0.043) (0.045) (0.050)
[0.033] [0.036] [0.033] [0.036] [0.035] [0.040]
Treat -0.311∗∗∗ -0.338∗∗∗ -0.291∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.088) (0.097)
[0.105] [0.099] [0.108]
Rain (z-scored)× Treat 0.074 0.052 0.097
(0.078) (0.075) (0.084)
[0.075] [0.073] [0.081]
Subdistrict FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Subdistrict trends N N Y Y N N
Include lagged rainfall N N N N Y Y
N 15620 15620 15620 15620 15620 15620
Census waves 00-14 00-14 00-14 00-14 00-14 00-14
Table A.22 displays the impact of rainfall on suicides. The suicide rate is defined as described
in Table A.1. Rainfall is net of subdistrict level trends and standardized to have mean zero and
standard deviation one. Odd columns report the impact of rainfall on suicides. Even columns
include the treatment variable from the conditional cash transfer roll-out and the interaction with
rainfall. All specifications include subdistrict and year fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 additionally
control for subdistrict time trends. Columns 5 and 6 also include the first, second and third
lag of rainfall. Observations are weighted by 2005 subdistrict population. Parentheses report
Conley (1999) standard errors, allowing for arbitrary time correlation and two-dimensional spatial
correlation within a 100 kilometre radius of the subdistrict centroid (used for stars). Standard
errors clustered at the district level are in square brackets.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.23: Interactions between agricultural productivity shocks and the cash transfers
- detrended and not population weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Suicide rate
Rain (z-scored) -0.149∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.060) (0.056) (0.058) (0.059) (0.064)
[0.050] [0.055] [0.049] [0.053] [0.049] [0.057]
Treat -0.414∗∗∗ -0.479∗∗∗ -0.376∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.127) (0.130)
[0.147] [0.142] [0.150]
Rain (z-scored)× Treat 0.256∗∗ 0.204∗ 0.301∗∗
(0.110) (0.108) (0.118)
[0.107] [0.106] [0.117]
Subdistrict FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Subdistrict trends N N Y Y N N
Include lagged rainfall N N N N Y Y
N 15620 15620 15620 15620 15620 15620
Census waves 00-14 00-14 00-14 00-14 00-14 00-14
Table A.23 displays the impact of rainfall on suicides. The suicide rate is defined as described
in Table A.1. Rainfall is net of subdistrict level trends and standardized to have mean zero and
standard deviation one. Odd columns report the impact of rainfall on suicides. Even columns
include the treatment variable from the conditional cash transfer roll-out and the interaction with
rainfall. All specifications include subdistrict and year fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 additionally
control for subdistrict time trends. Columns 5 and 6 also include the first, second and third lag of
rainfall. Parentheses report Conley (1999) standard errors, allowing for arbitrary time correlation
and two-dimensional spatial correlation within a 100 kilometre radius of the subdistrict centroid
(used for stars). Standard errors clustered at the district level are in square brackets.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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A.7 Microdata on Depression: IFLS
Table A.24: Microdata on depression: individual level heterogeneity
Male Aged < 50 (median) Baseline expenditure (z-scored)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: depression z-score
Rain (z-scored) -0.175∗∗∗ -0.067 -0.128∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.047) (0.042)
[0.050] [0.049] [0.042]
Rain (z-scored) × Heterogeneity 0.107∗ -0.152∗∗ 0.047∗∗
(0.059) (0.066) (0.022)
[0.057] [0.068] [0.023]
Individual FE Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y
N 5192 5192 5188
IFLS Waves used 4-5 4-5 4-5
Table A.24 displays heterogeneous effects of rainfall on depression z-scores by individual level characteristics using
the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS). Depression scores are measured in 2011 and 2014 using the 10 item
CES-D scale (Radloff, 1997). Age is based on the respondent’s age in IFLS wave 4. Baseline expenditure uses
pre-determined per-capita expenditure from IFLS wave 3. All specifications control for differential trends. The
sample is restricted to individuals tracked in all five IFLS waves. The sample is further restricted to individuals
living in households with a member working in agriculture (self-employed without or with temporary workers, or as
casual or family workers) in any of the five waves. IFLS wave 1 contains no coded sector information. Therefore, all
individuals working as temporary workers or those who are self-employed without permanent workers are counted
as working in agriculture. This makes up 60% of IFLS individuals. The coefficients of the heterogeneity variable
are omitted to save space. All specifications are conditional on individual and time fixed effects and allowing for
different trends by the heterogeneity variable. Parentheses report Conley (1999) standard errors, allowing for
arbitrary time correlation and two-dimensional spatial correlation within a 100 kilometre radius of the subdistrict
centroid (used for stars). Standard errors clustered at the district level are in square brackets. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.25: Correlates of depression scores
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable:
Baseline depression z-score
Bottom decile 0.102∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
of food expenditure (0.032) (0.033)
CCT recipient in 2014 0.146∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.051)
N 19677 19637 19637
IFLS wave used 4 4 4
Table A.25 displays correlations with depression scores in the Indonesian Family Life Survey
(IFLS) wave 4. IFLS 4 was collected before the roll-out of the conditional cash transfer
program in 2007 and 2008. Depression scores are measured using the 10 item CES-D scale
(Radloff, 1997). Column 1 shows the correlation between being in the bottom decile of the
IFLS wave 4 per-capita household expenditure distribution and depression z-scores. Column
2 shows the correlation between having received the program at some point between IFLS
wave 4 and wave 5 (collected in IFLS wave 5 (2014)). Column three includes both variables
simultaneously. The sample is restricted to individuals tracked in IFLS wave 4 and wave 5.
Standard errors are clustered at the subdistrict level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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A.8 Mechanisms and heterogeneity
Table A.26: Including endogenous controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Suicide rate
Treatment -0.358∗∗∗ -0.327∗∗∗ -0.366∗∗∗ -0.325∗∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.095) (0.100) (0.107) (0.103)
Subdistrict FE Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y
Crime controls N Y N N N
Institution controls N N Y N N
Social capital controls N N N N Y
Census waves 05-14 05-14 05-14 05-11 05-11
Control mean (2011 & 2014) 1.797 1.797 1.797 1.797 1.797
N 9414 9414 9414 6276 6276
Table A.26 displays treatment effects on the suicide rate controlling for potential mediators. The suicide
rate is defined as described in Table A.1. All estimations are weighted using 2005 population size. All
specifications include time and subdistrict fixed effects. In Columns (1) to (3) we use observations
from the 2005, 2011 and 2014 census. In Columns (4) and (5) we use observations from the 2005 and
2011 village census, as data on social capital was not available in the 2014 census. Standard errors are
clustered at the district level.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.27: Subdistrict level heterogeneous treatment effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: Suicide rate
Treatment -0.234 -0.357∗∗∗ -0.356∗∗∗ -0.380∗∗∗ -0.346∗∗∗ -0.283∗∗ -0.274∗
(0.147) (0.101) (0.113) (0.103) (0.108) (0.139) (0.145)
Treatment × 0.218∗ 0.122
Fract poor (z) (0.122) (0.095)
Treatment × -0.105 -0.117
Perc. Farmers (z) (0.102) (0.072)
Treatment × 0.120 0.026
Per Capita Excp (z) (0.086) (0.059)
Treatment × 0.145 0.077
Per Capita Crimes (z) (0.218) (0.183)
Treatment × 0.277 0.015
Per Capita Social Institutions (z) (0.198) (0.191)
Treatment × -0.244 -0.127
Per Capita Health Institutions (z) (0.256) (0.223)
Minimum detectable effect size 0.266 0.202 0.165 0.512 0.535 0.624
N 9414 9414 9414 9414 9414 9414 9414
Census waves 05-14 05-14 05-14 05-14 05-14 05-14 05-14
Table A.27 displays heterogeneous treatment effects on the suicide rate for the cash transfer roll-out by
baseline district level characteristics. The suicide rate is defined as described in Table A.1. All specifica-
tion include time and subdistrict fixed effects. All estimations are weighted using 2005 population size.
All interaction term variables, interactsd, are based on the 2005 census, and are z-scored using the mean
and standard deviation of the sample. All specifications control for differential trends by interaction
variables, interactsd × postt, where post is defined as post-baseline years. “Minimum detectable effect
size” provides us with the minimum detectable effect size at 0.8 power and significance levels of 0.05
for heterogeneous treatment effects for the different interactions variables. Estimates are based on
years 2005 to 2014. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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B Additional Figures
Figure A.1: Mean suicide rates over time
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Notes: Figure A.1 displays mean suicide rates over time by treatment wave. The definition
of the suicide rate per 100,000 people changes slightly over time. In 2014 it is defined as the
number of suicides and suicide attempts per 100,000. In 2011 it is defined as the number of
suicides per 100,000. From 2000 to 2005 the suicide rate is defined as the number of villages
in a given subdistrict with at least one suicide per 100,000.
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Figure A.2: Mean suicide rates by treatment group over time – not population-weighted
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Notes: Figure A.2 displays mean suicide rates over time by treatment wave without population weights. The suicide rate
is defined as in Figure A.1.
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Figure A.3: Event-study: roll-out of conditional cash transfer program – not population-
weighted
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Notes: Figure 1 displays pre-trends relative to the timing of the introduction of the conditional cash transfer program by
treatment wave without population weights. The suicide rate is defined as in Figure A.1. Differences in the first period
before the treatment are normalized to zero. The displayed coefficients are the difference-in-differences treatment effect
estimates relative to subdistricts that had not received the treatmet until 2014. All standard errors are clustered at the
district level. The vertical red line indicates between which periods the program was first introduced.
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Figure A.4: Event-study: randomized controlled trial
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Notes: Figure A.4 displays the coefficients of an interaction between an indicator for whether a given subdistrict was
randomly chosen to receive the PKH cash transfer program and year dummies, conditional on year and subdistrict
fixed effects. Effects in 2005 are normalized to zero. Standard errors are clustered at subdistrict level. The suicide
rate is defined as in Figure A.1.
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Figure A.5: Event-study relative to 2000: randomized controlled trial
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Notes: Figure A.5 displays the coefficients of an interaction between an indicator for whether a given subdistrict was
randomly chosen to receive the PKH cash transfer program and year dummies, conditional on year and subdistrict
fixed effects. Effects in 2000 are normalized to zero. Standard errors are clustered at subdistrict level. The suicide
rate is defined as in Figure A.1.
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Figure A.6: Mean suicide rates over time (Poisson extrapolation)
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Notes: Figure A.6 displays mean Poisson-extrapolated suicide rates over time by treatment wave with 2005 population
weights. Subdistrict number of suicides is extrapolated from mean incidence of at least one subdistrict assuming a homo-
geneous village level Poisson distribution within each subdistrict and year.
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Figure A.7: Event-study: roll-out of conditional cash transfer program (Poisson extrap-
olation)
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Notes: Figure A.7 displays pre-trends relative to the timing of the introduction of the conditional cash transfer program by
treatment wave. The suicide rate is defined as in Figure A.6. All specifications use 2005 population weights. Differences
in the first period before the treatment are normalized to zero. The displayed coefficients are the difference-in-differences
treatment effect estimates relative to never treated subdistricts. All standard errors are clustered at the district level. The
vertical red line indicates between which periods the program was first introduced.
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